Xenophon’s failed imperialists : the question of empire in the Hellenica by Zug, Charles Ulrich
Copyright 
by 
Charles Ulrich Zug 
2017 
The Thesis Committee for Charles Ulrich Zug 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
Xenophon’s Failed Imperialists: The Question of Empire in the 
Hellenica 
APPROVED BY 
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE: 
Thomas L. Pangle 
Devin Stauffer 
Supervisor: 
Xenophon’s Failed Imperialists: The Question of Empire in the 
Hellenica 
by 
Charles Ulrich Zug 
Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
Master of Arts 
The University of Texas at Austin 
August 2017 
 Dedication 
To Grant and Cynthia Witherspoon. 
v 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my teachers, Thomas Pangle and Devin Stauffer. 
vi 
Abstract 
Xenophon’s Failed Imperialists: The Question of Empire in the 
Hellenica 
Charles Ulrich Zug, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
Supervisor:  Thomas L. Pangle 
In Xenophon’s Hellenica, or “Greek Affairs” from 404-362 BCE, both empire and its 
absence entail characteristic advantages and disadvantages. An international arrangement 
without empire is necessarily one of empire-seekers; and the quest for empire is, while 
impressive, also a risky and destabilizing enterprise. Xenophon illuminates these aspects 
of empire in the Hellenica by drawing our attention to the rise and fall of three empire-
seekers, thereby revealing the considerable advantages that such human beings bring with 
them to political life. These advantages consist, above all, in dependable order, foresight 
regarding future contingencies, and the capacity on the part of rulers to anticipate such 
contingencies. By the same token, Xenophon reveals what political life lacks when empire 
is absent in the international sphere: A crucial cause of Greece’s confusion and disorder is 
the absence of any single man or city capable of imposing stable rule through empire. More 
specifically, however, Xenophon depicts surpassingly capable potential rulers—most 
notably, Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Jason of Pherai—coming to premature ruin. One of 
the core questions of the Hellenica, then, concerns why all of Greece’s empire-seekers fail 
in their ambitions, as well as how they achieve their successes initially. Is it by the “science 
of empire,” evinced most clearly by Cyrus the Great, the main character of Xenophon’s 
historical novel, The Education of Cyrus? Or do chance, or providential deities, play a 
greater role in the initial successes, as well as in the ultimate failures, of Xenophon’s failed 
imperialists than we might at first realize? 
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I. Introduction 
“When we reflect on the fame of Thebes and Argos, of Sparta and Athens, we can scarcely 
persuade ourselves that so many immortal republics of ancient Greece were lost in a single 
province of the Roman Empire.” 
-Edward Gibbon 
After several decades of global hegemony, the United States of America has begun 
seriously to reconsider its geopolitical role and purpose. Should America strive to retain its 
position as superpower, as some would advocate?1 Or, in the words of a former Obama 
Administration advisor, should it craft a new position for itself, relinquishing its former 
quasi-imperial status and seeking rather to “lead from behind”?2 Notwithstanding the 
urgency of this question for Americans of the twenty-first century, the more fundamental 
question of empire—what are its advantages and disadvantages, both for the ruler and for 
the ruled?—is by no means a new one for the United States. Beginning with Alexander 
Hamilton and his Anti-Federalist opponents, American statesmen have kindled a robust 
debate over the merits of imperialism—a debate which continues today, as anti-
colonialists, neoconservatives, liberal internationalists, and (most recently) conservative 
internationalists question whether the United States and the nations of the world benefit 
from a superpower capable of projecting unmatched force, for good or for ill, in the 
international arena. 
1 See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, “Decline is a Choice,” The Weekly Standard, October 19, 2009. 
2 Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist,” The New Yorker, May 2, 2011. For a critical account of Obama’s view, 
see Herbert London, Leading from Behind (New York: Liberty Island Media, 2017), and Charles 
Krauthammer, “The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind,” The Washington Post, April 28, 2011. 
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Yet while there is, and has been, no shortage of defenders and partisans in this 
regard, can we point to a political thinker—classical or contemporary—whose work brings 
to light the best and the worst of what empire and those who seek it have to offer? It is the 
contention of the present study that Xenophon’s Hellenica contains just such an argument. 
For Xenophon, both empire and its absence entail characteristic advantages and 
disadvantages. An international arrangement without empire is necessarily one of empire-
seekers. And the quest for empire is, while impressive, also a risky and destabilizing 
enterprise. To this end, Xenophon examines in the Hellenica the rise and fall of three 
empire-seekers, so as to illuminate the considerable advantages that such human beings 
bring with them to political life. These advantages consist, perhaps above all, in dependable 
order, foresight regarding future contingencies, and the capacity on the part of rulers to 
anticipate such contingencies. By the same token, Xenophon reveals what political life 
lacks when empire is absent from the international sphere. He thereby invites us to think 
through, on the basis of the struggle between freedom and empire that takes place in the 
Hellenica, whether or not the success of Greece's three great failed empire-seekers—
Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Jason of Pherai—would have been good for “Greek Affairs,” 
generally. 
Now commentators have long agreed that Xenophon intended the Hellenica to 
continue Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, a work long regarded 
as the basis of modern international relations theory, and consequently, respected by 
political scientists and policymakers, alike. Anyone who turns to the Hellenica expecting 
Thucydides will be sorely disappointed, however. Thucydides’ work comes to light as a 
 3 
tour de force of poetic unity; its themes—justice, necessity, and the conflict between 
Athens and Sparta as the fundamental alternatives—are vivid and pronounced, and emerge 
effortlessly from the subject on which Thucydides concentrates all of his attention: the 
Peloponnesian War, the greatest war, whose examination discloses the permanent truth and 
therefore remains a “possession for all times.”3  
By vivid contrast, the Hellenica’s sole unifying theme would seem to be that it has 
no unifying theme—which Xenophon suggests by means of his work’s nebulous title: 
literally, “Greek Affairs” or “Greek Things.”4 As a result, oceans of ink have been spilt by 
scholars trying to clear up the Hellenica’s manifest “strangeness,”5 the vast6 majority of 
commentators contending that the Hellenica consists of multiple and distinct parts which 
should be studied as distinct works in themselves.7 On this basis, these scholars further 
contend that the Hellenica contains no discernable unifying purpose or teaching.  
Vivienne Grey, today’s most notable Hellenica scholar in the field of history, says 
the Hellenica “begins in media res as a continuation of Thucydides’ unfinished history,” 
and asserts that it is simply a “fact” that the Hellenica continues Thucydides’ work.8 This 
                                                 
3 Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, 1.22.4. 
4 The title is a plural substantive adjective. I have used E.C. Marchant’s Oxford Clarendon edition (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961), as well as the Loeb edition, Carleton L. Brownson, trans. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1950). I have also made frequent use of Robert B. Strassler’s “Landmark” 
translation--particularly, of this edition’s chronology and maps (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009). Unless 
otherwise noted, all references to dates in terms of “BCE” are based on the “Landmark” edition. 
5 Eduard Schwartz 1889 “Quellenuntersuchungen zur grieschischen Geschichte.” Reinishes Museum 44 
(1889): 184-185. Cited by W.E. Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977) 100. 
6 As I will discuss briefly near the end of the present chapter, there are less than ten scholars, out of the 
hundred who have written on the Hellenica, who read the work as a single, unified work.  
7 See Henry, Greek Historical Writing, for the most comprehensive survey of this view. 
8 Vivienne Grey, The Character of Xenophon’s Hellenica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1989) 1. For the same 
view, see also David Thomas, “Introduction” to the Landmark Hellenica, xxx-xxxiv. 
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may very well be the case; yet, if true, a whole host of implications would follow from it. 
To take just one: If Xenophon intended the Hellenica and the Peloponnesian War to form 
a single work, does this mean that Xenophon agreed with Thucydides about, say, the causes 
of the Peloponnesian War, and the purpose of historical writing, in general? The Hellenica, 
for its part, supplies us with no explicit answers to these questions, and so to figure out if 
Xenophon supplies us with answers, we must look within the text itself for clues. The 
question of continuation leads, in turn, naturally to the question of intention. 
Grey, however, further obscures the difficulty of discerning Xenophon’s intention 
by declaring that “the tradition in which Xenophon is assumed to be writing is the tradition 
of Thucydides.”9 No doubt, there is something to this. Like Thucydides’ work, the 
Hellenica is written in prose, and contains both narrative and speeches. The question of 
what continuation is remains, however, since the fact alone that two works share a subject 
and style by no means implies that the works’ authors had the same purpose in writing—
or, for that matter, the same teaching about their subject to convey. On this score, David 
Thomas postulates: “Presumably because he saw himself as continuing Thucydides, 
Xenophon did not follow his predecessors and provide a preface setting out the scope and 
methods of his work. It seems that he thought that this would be obvious.”10  
This possibility leads us directly to a third puzzle: Assuming Xenophon did write 
with the same purpose as Thucydides, did he therefore intend for Thucydides’ methodology 
to apply to the entire Hellenica, or only to the subject that Thucydides, himself, explicitly 
                                                 
9 Grey, Character, 1. 
10 David Thomas, “Introduction,” xxx. 
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says he will “write together”: The War between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians? As 
Grey herself points out: “Admittedly, the greater part of [the Hellenica] concerned events 
subsequent to [the Peloponnesian] war.”11 But why? If Xenophon had the same purpose as 
Thucydides, why would he spend more than two thirds of the “continuation” on a subject 
other than Thucydides’ own? This question, and the related question of the interrelation of 
the two “parts,” must be answered satisfactorily if the “continuation” quandary is to be 
resolved. If Xenophon really intended for the Hellenica to serve this purpose of continuing 
Thucydides’ work, and nothing more, then how hard would it have been for him to insert 
a single line into his seven-volume tome saying precisely this—and, in so doing, to clear 
up any question of the relation between the Hellenica and The Peloponnesian War?  
One might respond that if Xenophon wished for the end of Thucydides’ work to 
blend seamlessly into his own work, with the result that the two could be read as a single 
work, then any statement on Xenophon’s part would have interrupted the work’s natural 
flow.12 This answer is vulnerable to an obvious counter-question, namely: If Xenophon 
wished to create the illusion of continuity between his work and Thucydides’, why provide 
his work with a title of its own: Hellenica? Moreover, why chronicle “Greek Affairs” from 
the end of the Peloponnesian War (404 BCE) until 362 BCE—forty-two additional years—
given that Thucydides’ own stated intention was to “write together,” not Greek Affairs 
                                                 
11 Grey, Character, 1. 
12 Another possible response is that Xenophon did discuss the Hellenica’s relation to Thucydides, albeit in 
an introduction to the Hellenica which has been lost; this is the “lacuna” hypothesis, which McLaren 
discredited in his essay, “A Supposed Lacuna at the Beginning of Xenophon’s Hellenica,” American Journal 
of Philology 100 (1979): 228-238. See also Grey, Character, 197 n.2: “There is no evidence for a missing 
preface or lacuna.” 
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404-362 BCE, but the twenty-seven year “war between the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians”? 
It is to Grey’s credit that she raises this objection and takes it seriously. Yet her 
answer leaves us puzzled. After acknowledging that “the problem of the nature of the 
continuation remains unsolved,”13 Grey begins to separate the Hellenica into two parts: (1) 
“the continuation” and (2) “the rest of the work”—as if, for interpretive reasons, the work 
must be read as if it were two rather than one.14 In so doing, she anticipates the judgement 
of Tuplin, who, like Grey, seeks to discern in the Hellenica a serious teaching, yet who 
insists nonetheless on maintaining the consensus view that the Hellenica lacks a principles 
of unity: “To be blunt, the two sections, which in the first instances must be regarded as to 
all extents and purposes separate works, have to be studied separately and in isolation 
before there can be any question of a global judgement of Hellenica.”15 
The “disunity” thesis maintained by Grey, Thomas, and Tuplin seems to have 
originated in a 1836 philological essay by Karl Wilhelm Krüger, of which W.P. Henry 
provides the following helpful summary.16 Krüger argues that Xenophon, having as a 
young man inherited Thucydides’ notes, fashioned these into what has come down to us as 
the first two books of the Hellenica, which end with the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants. 
These, Xenophon published as Thucydides’ works, even though he himself had written the 
                                                 
13 Character, 2. 
14 Character, 2. 
15 Tuplin, The Failings of Empire (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993), 11.  
16 Karl Wilhelm Krüger, “Prüfund der Niebuhrschen Ansicht über Xenophons Hellenika,” Historisch-
philologische Studien 1, Berlin (1836). Henry discusses this work at length in Chapter One of Greek 
Historical Writing (Chicago: Argonaut, 1966). 
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addition touching on the Thirty. As for the glaringly-obvious question of why Xenophon 
then proceeded to publish this writing, together with the five books that constitute the rest 
of the Hellenica—as if the seven books constituted a single whole—Krüger spins the 
following (to repeat, utterly conjectural) yarn. After finishing the first two books, 
Xenophon left for his famous Anabasis; and as a result, he did not get around to the 
chronicling the post Thirty-Tyrants affairs of Greece until he retired as an old man. Once 
finished with these chronicles, however, instead of simply publishing the chronicles as a 
separate work—presumably, the most rational alternative—he decided instead to strap 
them together with the Thucydides notes he had inherited as a young man, as well as the 
account of the Thirty, and then to publish all of them as a whole--the Hellenica!  
Commentators have almost unanimously shared Krüger’s presupposition that, in 
making sense of the Hellenica, the scholar’s aim should not to be to discover what 
Xenophon might have to teach about politics and human affairs, but rather, to discover the 
historical circumstances of its composition.17 A pervasive logical flaw consequently 
pervades many of these otherwise helpful works of scholarship, namely, The Hellenica 
could not have a unified teaching, because it obviously consists of distinct parts; and the 
Hellenica must consist of distinct parts, since it obviously has no unified teaching. Yet the 
initial question of unity necessarily determines whether one approaches the Hellenica with 
an open mind. Hence, according to a few scholars who maintain the disunity thesis, 
                                                 
17 To this end, Grey probably has scholars like Krüger in mind when she states that “the modern explanations 
of why Thucydides took the story of the Peloponnesian War further than Thucydides envisaged are really no 
better than” “the explanation put forward by the ancient commentator, Dionysius of Halicarnassus,” 
Character, 3.  
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Xenophon’s lack of unified purpose in composing the Hellenica renders the work’s 
contents rather trivial, at least in comparison with the content of Thucydides’ work.18 
Renowned classical scholars such as Cawkwell and Warner, for example, demote the 
Hellenica to the status of “memoirs”19—i.e., reflections and observations about his own 
life, lacking any deeper theoretical and pedagogical purpose. Hence, we read in W.P. 
Henry’s classic monograph that the “problem” of the Hellenica is “historiographical,” i.e., 
that the problem of understanding the Hellenica concerns primarily “the circumstances 
under which an account of history is written,”20 rather than discerning what Xenophon 
intends to teach us. 
Nevertheless, that Xenophon does intend to teach something important is argued in 
a few Hellenica studies which take seriously the possibility that Xenophon wrote the 
Hellenica with a deeper logic and purpose.21 These studies testify to a renewed interest in 
the political thought of Xenophon which has emerged in the last half-century.22 Gerald 
                                                 
18 For a critical summary of this scholarly position, see Higgins, Xenophon, 98-100. 
19 Christopher Tuplin summarizes the “memoirs” theory--with which he himself disagrees--as follows: “The 
Hellenica falls into two parts (1.1.1-2.3.10; 2.3.11-7.5.27), of which the second was composed in the 350s, 
the first much earlier (though after Xenophon had left Athens). The second part should be regarded as 
Memoirs (a record of Xenophon's direct experience or his experience 'by hearsay' heavily informed by the 
Peloponnesian bias of his post-394 life-style) not History; a work, therefore, characterized by partiality (in 
both senses) and, despite the complimentary statement that the vital historical period 404-362 B.C. would, 
without Xenophon hardly seem worth the knowing, deserving of the large fall in its reputation stimulated by 
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. The first part, though a conscious continuation of Thucydides and Thucydidean in 
certain ways, is also essentially Memoirs not History.” This summary is to be found in Tuplin, “Review of 
The Penguin Hellenica,” The Classical Review 30, No. 1 (1980): 6. For stylistic and grammatical reasons, I 
have altered the passage slightly in my quotation of it. See also A History of My Times, translated by Rex 
Warner and with an introduction by G. Cawkwell, New York: Penguin, 1978. 
20 Greek Historians, 14. 
21 See Ariel Helfer, “Socrates’ Political Legacy,” (paper presented at the 2015 Midwest Political Science 
Association conference, Chicago, IL); Gerald Proietti, Xenophon’s Sparta (Leiden: Brill, 1987); Christopher 
Tuplin, Failings; Leo Strauss, “Greek Historians,” Review of Metaphysics (1968). 
22Eric Buzzetti, “New Developments in Xenophon Studies,” Interpretation 30, 2, 2003 157-178. 
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Proietti’s monograph, Xenophon’s Sparta, argues persuasively that the Hellenica contains 
a thematic, coherent, sustained analysis of the Spartan regime most broadly understood: 
how that regime operates within the borders of Sparta, as well as the ways it shapes those 
nurtured by it. Accordingly, Proietti examines the imperialistic ambitions evinced by 
Sparta after the Peloponnesian War; he discerns, among other fascinating themes, a muted 
critique of Sparta by Xenophon.23  
More important for our present purposes, however, Proietti articulates in general 
terms the methodology that I follow in the present study: “The approach that seems most 
natural [in trying to understand the Hellenica] is to begin by examining the parts and 
looking to see how those parts might combine to forms a unified whole.”24 In considering 
the question of the Hellenica’s structure with an open mind—i.e., without having decided 
at the outset that it lacks a coherent structure—we discover, through attentive reading, that 
the themes of empire and empire-seeking are prominent ones. For in Xenophon’s account, 
the Greeks’ abiding concern with empire gives rise to the seemingly incomprehensible 
chaos, the endless reversals and vicissitudes that constitute “Greek Affairs” from 411 to 
362 BCE. Xenophon’s account shows the cities of Greece encountering frustration at every 
turn as they form and break countless alliances, seek and lose regional hegemony, and 
jostle unsuccessfully among themselves for empire over all of Greece. As Higgins aptly 
notes, the Hellenica “is a history of repeated attempts at empire and the continual 
                                                 
23 In so doing, Proietti “refutes the” almost universally accepted “charge that Xenophon was biased in favor 
of Sparta.” David Bolotin, “Considering Sparta and Reconsidering Xenophon,” The Review of Politics 51, 2 
(1989): 303. 
24 Xenophon’s Sparta, xxi. 
 10 
subversion of independence and order itself throughout the Greek world.”25 To compare 
the Hellenica to our own historical context, one could say that overturning and replacing 
precisely the political world which Xenophon depicts in his Hellenica--a world 
characterized by endless instability, and composed of “wretched nurseries of unceasing 
discord”26--was the express purpose of those great philosophers and philosophic statesmen 
who conceived, initiated, and founded modern politics.  
Yet even in comparison with Xenophon’s own political writings, the chaos and 
frustration which the Hellenica depicts stand in particularly vivid contrast with that 
depicted in the Education of Cyrus. In that text, the effortlessness and skill with which 
Cyrus the Great achieves the very pinnacle of political power, and imposes order on the 
lands he rules, persuades us that “ruling human beings...with science” is indeed possible, 
as Xenophon asserts in that work’s introduction.27 Everything Cyrus the imperialist par 
excellence touches seemingly turns to gold.28 By contrast, the Hellenica appears to be 
rhetorically calculated to make us question the very possibility of a science of rule or 
empire (arxē), which the Education persuaded us to be possible. The observation with 
which Xenophon opens the Education, that “human beings unite against none more than 
                                                 
25 Higgins, Xenophon, 103-104. 
26 Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist #9. 
27 The Education of Cyrus 1.1.3. For an illuminating discussion of Cyrus’ “science of empire,” see W. R. 
Newell, “Tyranny and the ‘Science of Ruling’ in Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus,” The Journal of Politics 
45, 4 (1983): 889-906. 
28 One might object that the last chapter of the Education undercuts my characterization of the work here. 
While there is some truth to this objection, it is important not to lose the forest for the trees. The critique of 
Cyrus that Xenophon spells out in the last chapter does show that Cyrus’ political gains were short-lived after 
his death. As a whole, however, the Education depicts an immensely successful imperialist and gives the 
impression that such empire is possible and in important respects desirable. To explain Xenophon’s critique 
of empire in the Education adequately, would not one also need to explain why Xenophon felt the need to 
present that critique as powerful praise of Cyrus as a successful empire-seeker? 
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against those whom they perceive attempting to rule them,”29 is thereby manifestly born 
out in the Hellenica as a whole. As Xenophon asserts at his works conclusion, having 
described the climatic inter-Greek battle of Mantinea, “neither side was found to be any 
better off, as regards either additional territory, or city, or empire (arxē), than before the 
battle came to be; but even more (heti pleiōn) confusion and disorder (akrisia de kai taraxē) 
obtained in Greece after the battle than before” (7.5.27). Xenophon thus further implies 
that even before Mantinea’s chaotic outcome, all of Greece existed in a condition of 
“confusion and disorder.” 
As I argue, Xenophon shows that a crucial cause of Greece’s confusion and disorder 
is the absence of any single man or city capable of imposing stable rule or empire. Every 
imperial enterprise and grand political ambition Xenophon describes ends up frustrated; 
impressive and admirable men almost succeed in their ambitions, but in the end, fail utterly. 
More specifically, Xenophon depicts surpassingly capable potential rulers—most notably, 
Alcibiades, Thrasyboulos, and Jason of Pherai—coming to premature ruin as a result of 
what would seem to be incalculable chance. Thus, in stark contrast with Xenophon’s 
fictional Cyrus the Great, everything these Greeks touch in the Hellenica seemingly turns 
to lead.  
One of the great puzzles of the Hellenica, then, is why all of Greece’s empire-
seekers fail in their ambitions. Each of the three failures I examine brings to light features 
of the ambition for empire as such. Of the three, Xenophon shows Jason of Pherai to be 
                                                 
29 Education 1.1.2 
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particularly aware of the extent to which chance pervades political affairs; it is with 
considerable dramatic irony that we read, shortly before his abrupt downfall, Jason’s 
statement that “the god, it seems, takes joy (xairei) in frequently making the great small, 
and the small, great” (6.4.24). Jason, perhaps the Hellenica’s most promising empire-
seeker (Xenophon proclaims him “the greatest man of his [time]” [6.4.28]), turns out also 
to be its most skeptical as regards man’s capacity to guarantee political success through the 
pursuit of empire. For Jason exhibits an intuitive awareness of the nature of political life 
as the Hellenica depicts it—that is, an awareness of the fragility of human power in the 
face of chance. Both Alcibiades and Thrasybulus confirm the truth of Jason’s intuition 
through the ends they meet; for both men, after incredible successes, come to ruin through 
seemingly incalculable chance. However, in Xenophon’s depiction, neither of these men 
exhibits Jason’s awareness of the fragility of human undertakings. Alcibiades—who is 
blamed by the Athenians for impiety, and whom many of the Athenians “prophesize” will 
ruin both himself and the city (1.4.12)—evinces great confidence in purely-human power. 
And Thrasybulus, by contrast, puts enormous trust in the Olympian gods, whom he 
believes fight alongside those who are just. And while Thrasybulus proves to be correct as 
regards his restoration of the Athenian democracy, he proves to be incorrect as regards his 
gambit for a new Athenian empire. 
Thus, in drawing our attention to the failures of Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Jason, 
Xenophon challenges us to uncover the causes by which these men in particular failed to 
achieve the aims they pursued—aims which Xenophon causes us to anticipate they will 
achieve. Accordingly, that even the Hellenica’s most successful and promising empire-
 13 
seekers come to ruin through chance events—events which neither they nor we 
(Xenophon’s readers) could reasonably have foreseen—induces us to examine whether 
these events are, in fact, chance ones. More specifically, it induces us to investigate 
Xenophon’s own assertion that “many other Greek affairs (hellenica) as well as barbarian 
affairs [show] that (hōs) the gods are unconcerned neither (houte) with impious things 
(asebountōn) nor (houte) with those who do unholy things” (tōn anosia poiountōn 5.4.1).30 
By positing that “Greek affairs” were steered by providential gods—that is, gods concerned 
with “impious things” and “those who do unholy things”—Xenophon prompts us to 
investigate his description of the rise and fall of those human figures that seem to steer 
“Greek affairs” most decisively. By virtue of what, precisely, did these achieve their 
successes initially? Was it by the “science of empire” that Cyrus the Great, a fictitious 
character, most clearly displays? Or did chance—or providential gods—play a greater role 
in their initial successes than we might at first realize? To answer these questions, let us 
turn now to Alcibiades, Xenophon’s first great failed imperialist. 
  
                                                 
30 Xenophon’s use of the double negative in this passage makes translating it rather awkward. Its sense would 
seem to be that many “Greek affairs” show that the gods are concerned with impious things and with those 
who do unholy things. Logically, however, the statement signifies only that the gods do not care about things 
that are not unholy and not impious. And a double-negative in a statement does not necessarily make that 
statement positive. 
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II. Alcibiades 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Alcibiades’ competence in military and political affairs sets him apart from the 
considerable lineup of characters Xenophon introduces us to in the Hellenica’s early 
“Athenian passages.”31 We consequently anticipate that Alcibiades will duly succeed in 
“salvag[ing] the former power” of the Athenian empire (1.4.20)—a goal which the 
Athenians, having pronounced Alcibiades “most capable” (kratistos 1.4.13), assigned him. 
Xenophon thereby fills us with expectations of a profoundly new political landscape in 
Greece, one dominated by an Alcibiadean empire capable of expanding well beyond 
Greece itself.  
Yet Xenophon also complicates matters for us by offering no explicit guidance for 
understanding Alcibiades’ role in Greek Affairs. He praises Alcibiades only in a “subdued” 
way,32 nowhere calling attention to Alcibiades’ strengths and weaknesses in his own 
name,33 choosing instead merely to present Alcibiades’ deeds, and a few of his speeches, 
and to let readers draw conclusions for themselves as to whether they are good or bad. As 
we shall see, Xenophon’s reticence in this regard is justified by the complicated role played 
                                                 
31  Proietti, Xenophon’s Sparta. Both Strauss and Proietti note the dominant role which Xenophon assigns to 
Alcibiades in the Hellenica’s early chapters. Strauss suggests that, with Alcibiades as its ruler, Athens might 
have defeated Lysander and avoided its final defeat by the Spartans. By extension, then, he suggests that the 
fate of the Athenian empire, together with the fate of Greek Affairs as a whole, was bound up with the man, 
Alcibiades. Proietti, accordingly, sees in Xenophon’s account of Alcibiades “a crucial part of the thematic 
development in the Athenian passages of Books I-II.” See “Greek Historians” 664-665; Xenophon’s Sparta 
109. 
32 “Greek Historians,” 664. 
33 Xenophon does with other notable characters in the Hellenica: Theramenes (2.3.56); Jason of Pherai 
(6.4.28); Teleutias (5.1.3-4); Iphicrates (6.2.27-32, esp. 32). 
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by Alcibiades in events leading up to Athens’ eventual defeat and capitulation to Sparta. 
Accordingly, in his Memorabilia, Xenophon explicitly refuses to defend Alcibiades—if 
Alcibiades “harmed [Athens] in some way” (1.2.12-13).34 Refusing to defend, of course, 
is not the same as to condemning. The condition that Xenophon adds to his statement here 
thus prompts us to investigate his depiction of Alcibiades in the Hellenica. In this depiction, 
Xenophon leads us to the following conclusion. Either Alcibiades’ premature ruin reveals 
the unfathomable degree to which human affairs are governed by chance, i.e., by 
necessities that are beyond our ability to foresee and anticipate; or it suggests that 
Alcibiades fell, not as a result of blind necessities which we could not reasonably expect 
him to have foreseen, but rather, through his impious conduct towards the gods.  
2. THE HELLENICA’S CHAOTIC OPENING 
 
Xenophon opens the Hellenica with a description of events taking place several 
days after the events described by Thucydides at the very end of the Peloponnesian War, 
in 411 BCE. Thucydides ends his narrative with Athens in dire straits. With their Sicilian 
expedition destroyed, the Persians liberally funding their Spartan nemeses, and their fleet 
under the general Thymochares recently defeated at Eretria (directly off Athens’ northern 
shore), the Athenians, by Thucydides’ account, look to be on their very last legs. On this 
score, at least, the Hellenica’s opening is hardly more encouraging. In its very first 
                                                 
34 See Helfer, “Socratic Characters,” 5-6. 
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sentence, the Athenians under the same Thymochares (now in the Hellespont) are said to 
lose a naval battle to the Spartans.  
Yet the general thrust of the Hellenica’s beginning differs crucially from that of 
Thucydides’ ending. Its opening pages describe a series of chaotic, inconclusive skirmishes 
fought between the Athenians and the Spartans in the Hellespont—followed immediately 
by the spectacular entrance of Alcibiades, who quickly and effortlessly brings order to the 
confusion. By juxtaposing these initial events with Alcibiades’ subsequent brilliant 
campaigns, Xenophon emphasizes an aspect of Alcibiades which Thucydides leaves in the 
background, namely Alcibiades’ capacity for bringing order where others have wrought 
disorder.  
The first battle Xenophon describes in detail, between the Spartans and Athenians 
at a place in the Hellespont called Abydos, is preceded by a series of awkward mishaps and 
reversals which give the impression that Greek Affairs are generally in a state of confusion. 
Dorieus, a Spartan general, sails into the Hellespont with a small fleet, and is quickly 
spotted by an Athenian lookout. Dorieus, who is taken utterly by surprise by the Athenians, 
flees, and the Athenians promptly give chase. Dorieus having evaded the Athenians, he 
then tries to beach his triremes at a place called Rhoiteion. Here, however, the Athenians 
catch up with him, and the two sides fight an inconclusive skirmish, at the end of which 
(reports Xenophon) “the Athenians accomplished nothing” (1.1.3). At this point, with the 
two sides stalemated, Xenophon mentions that a Spartan general named Mindarus catches 
sight of the ensuing battle and decides to try to rescue his comrade, Dorieus. This, in turn, 
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prompts the Athenians to attack Mindarus, as well as Dorieus: “the Athenians, fighting 
from morning till evening, won in some places and lost in others” (1.1.5).  
This series of back-and-forth, inconclusive confrontations between the Spartans 
and Athenians indicates that none of the combatants has any discernible strategy or plan of 
action. Rather, conflicts are triggered in the manner of stimulus-response: (1) Dorieus sails 
into Hellespont; (2) the Athenians notice him and chase him; (3) he flees to Rhoiteion and 
tries to beach his ships; (4) the Athenians assault him on the beach but fail to accomplish 
anything; (5) Mindarus happens to notice and tries to pick up Dorieus, (6) he fails; (7) the 
Athenians now fight with both Mindarus and Dorieus; (8) neither side can budge the other. 
What is more, the confusion Xenophon here depicts would seem to begin with Dorieus, 
who initiates the entire series of skirmishes by entering with his force into the Hellespont. 
Yet Xenophon says nothing about why Dorieus enters the Hellespont in the first place. Was 
he on a mission? Was he fleeing the Athenians? Was he seeking to engage the Athenians? 
We never learn; and nothing in Book Eight of Thucydides’ work gives us any clues.35 What 
Xenophon does make clear is that the Athenians, like a dog fetching a ball, automatically 
pursue Dorieus once he enters their field of vision. Here, again, the Greeks exhibit neither 
a plan nor foresight. By the looks of it, the Athenians were sitting about idly when Dorieus 
blindly stumbled into their midst. The Athenians, in turn, pursue Dorieus as a matter of 
course—yet fail to catch him. Dorieus then tries to beach his ships, but fails to do so 
                                                 
35 Dorieus, son of Diagoras, is mentioned by Thucydides twice, at 8.35.1 and 8.84.2. Neither mention gives 
us any clues as to Dorieus’ mission or goals at the time of the Hellenica’s opening, however. 
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because the Athenians catch him before he finishes. At this point, Mindarus swoops in to 
rescue Dorieus—yet he fails, as well.  
Every one of the attempts that Xenophon describes here fails. As a result, the battle 
that the two sides end up fighting at Abydos proceeds unevenly, with the Athenians gaining 
the advantage at some places but losing it at others. As I noted above, Thucydides’ account 
at the end of Book Eight leaves us with the impression that Athens is heading straight for 
defeat. Yet based on their respective performances at the Hellenica’s opening, it is difficult 
to say with any certainty whether the Athenians or the Spartans are more likely to win at 
Abydos--and for that matter, how the war, and Greek Affairs generally, are likely to 
proceed in the rest of the Hellenica. Xenophon’s report of these events seems rhetorically 
calculated to highlight confusion and disorder, and to force us to question our ability to 
predict outcomes.        
3. ALCIBIADES’ ENTRANCE: SHREWDNESS, ENERGY, AND FORESIGHT 
 
Order is suddenly imposed on this confusion, however, with the dramatic entrance 
of Alcibiades, who, like “a flash of lightening,”36 rushes onto the scene at Abydos and 
immediately defeats the Spartans (1.1.5-7). And in the passages that follow, Alcibiades’ 
successes only continue; from here until the beginning of Book Two, “every move 
Alcibiades makes is a coup.”37 After crushing the Spartans at Abydos, Alcibiades orders 
the Athenians to collect money, and—after escaping on horseback in the middle of the 
                                                 
36 Strauss, “Greek Historians,” 664; Proietti, Xenophon’s Sparta, 3. 
37 Helfer, “Socratic Characters,” 8. 
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night from Tissaphernes’ prison (1.1.10)—destroys a massive Spartan force at the battle of 
Cyzicus (1.1.16-18). This victory in turn prepares the groundwork for Alcibiades’ return 
to Athens. 
Let us briefly consider what, in Xenophon’s account, sets Alcibiades apart from his 
Greek counterparts at the beginning of Book One. After his initial victory at Abydos, 
Alcibiades makes an announcement to his soldiers in which he threatens with death 
“anyone who is caught sailing across to the opposite coast” (1.1.15). He does this precisely 
because he recognizes the need to keep his naval arrangements secret from the Spartans at 
nearby Cyzicus, whom he plans to attack next.38 A less foresighted mind, perhaps rendered 
overconfident by the sweetness of victory, would have missed this detail, thereby 
jeopardizing the whole enterprise. Alcibiades, by contrast, evidently recognizes that 
victory at present by no means guarantees victory to come; that prudent measures, such as 
preventing his men from giving away their position to the Spartans, must be taken in order 
to ward off surprises. And, as we might expect, Alcibiades’ secrecy enables him next to 
achieve a stunning victory over the Spartan force at Cyzicus. There, Alcibiades’ secrecy 
and daring, combined with astonishingly good luck—heavy rain conceals him as he 
successfully ambushes the Spartans under Mindarus (1.1.16-18)—result in decisive victory 
for the Athenians.  
After describing the battle, Xenophon dramatically switches scenes, showing us in 
quick succession two episodes which reveal a considerable disjunction between Persia’s 
                                                 
38 Strauss, “Greek Historians,” 664. 
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capacity to supply Sparta with funds, and Sparta’s capacity to make good use of these funds 
against Alcibiades. First, we see the Spartan general Hipparchus, having taken over for 
Mindarus (who was killed in the battle), sending the following pitiful message to Sparta: 
“Ships gone; Mindarus dead; men starving; nowhere to turn” (aporiomes 1.1.23). 
Xenophon heightens the pathetic character of this episode by noting that Hipparchus’ 
message never even made it to Sparta; it was “intercepted and taken to Athens” (1.1.23). 
The Spartans are so incompetent as to be unable to get an “S.O.S” message to Sparta; how, 
we wonder, can they possibly defeat Alcibiades? Second, Xenophon takes us to the camp 
of the defeated Spartans, where we see the Persian satrap Pharnabazus--the conduit through 
which Persia is funding Sparta--attempting to prevent the Spartans from losing heart in 
their war against Athens (1.2.24). Pharnabazus does this by assuring the Spartans that, 
notwithstanding the outcome of the battle, they have plenty of money from Persia to fall 
back on (1.1.24). 
This scene, which reveals the wealth of the Spartan-Persian alliance, Xenophon 
dramatically juxtaposes with Alcibiades’ frank assessment of the Athenians’ dire poverty. 
In the first speech of the Hellenica,39 Alcibiades announces the situation that the Athenians 
are in, and proposes a way out: “There is no money (chrēmata) with us, yet our enemies 
have unlimited (aphthona) money from the King” (1.1.14). Thus, just as Xenophon drew 
our attention to Alcibiades’ competence by juxtaposing him with Dorieus and Mindarus, 
now he spotlights Alcibiades’ weakness by contrasting him with the exceedingly well-
                                                 
39 Strauss, “Greek Historians”: “[T]he name Alcibiades is named up to this point (1.1.1-15) twice as often as 
the name of any other individual” 664. To this end, Xenophon gives the first speech of the Hellenica to 
Alcibiades. 
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funded Spartans and Persians. However, it is a crucial feature of Alcibiades’ competence 
that he is clear-sighted about his weakness, and the urgent need to remedy it. Alcibiades 
clearly sees that, while daring and energy have enabled him to best the Spartans so far, he 
needs money in order to sustain his enterprise into the future. 
4. ALCIBIADES AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF ATHENIAN EMPIRE 
 
The Hellenica’s opening reveals a Sparta ill-equipped for making good use of 
Persia’s infinite supplies, especially in the face of the all-resourceful enemy, Alcibiades. 
In revealing the Persians as incompetent “haves,” and Alcibiades as a highly competent 
“have not;” that is, by juxtaposing their respective capacities for making use of their 
possessions, Xenophon reminds us of words he himself spoke to his fellow Greeks while 
stranded in Persia: “Clearly, all of these good things”—namely, the good things of Persia—
belong to those who are most capable” (tōn kratountōn).40 “Those who are most capable,” 
whom Xenophon is referring to at this stage of the Anabasis, are of course the “Ten 
Thousand” Greek mercenaries, whom Cyrus enlisted to overthrow his brother, Artaxerxes. 
Xenophon in this speech recommends to the Ten Thousand that, once they return to Greece, 
they should encourage the other Greeks to relieve their “poverty” and to improve their 
conditions by invading Persia. For the Greeks are “most capable,” and the Persians, who 
are far less capable, possess “all of the good things.” Additionally, Xenophon’s 
                                                 
40 3.2.26. 
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juxtaposition of Alcibiades and the Persian-funded Spartans brings to mind a passage from 
the Education of Cyrus:  
The trial (dikē) was as such: a big boy with a little coat, finding a little boy with a 
big coat on, took it off him and put his own coat on him, while he put on the other's. 
So when I tried them, I judged that it was better for them both that each should keep 
the coat that fitted him.41 
 
The last is the initial conclusion drawn by that greatest imperialist depicted by Xenophon, 
Cyrus the Great. Cyrus founds an empire by taking land and supplies from those less 
capable, including Lydia, Babylon, and even Media, the country belonging to his very own 
uncle. Through his account of Alcibiades’ exploits, Xenophon invites us to wonder what 
Alcibiades might accomplish with Persia’s “infinite” supplies at his disposal. To be sure, 
Xenophon by no means announces or even explicitly states in the Hellenica his own 
thoughts regarding a renewed Athenian empire under Alcibiades; he never announces 
whether Greek affairs would have been improved or worsened by the success of 
Alcibiades’ imperial enterprise. At most, Xenophon induces us at these early stages in the 
Hellenica to consider whether Alcibiades’ surpassing military and political talents give him 
a legitimate claim to rule those whose capacities are inferior, and whether Greece would 
have been considerably benefitted by an empire under him. 
To return to Alcibiades’ enterprise, the Athenian victory at Cyzicus in no way 
induces him to rest easy. Rather, it spurs him to pursue his imperial ambitions all the more 
vehemently. Thus, after his victory at Cyzicus, Alcibiades immediately levies a tax on the 
citizens of that city, while at the same time--Xenophon adds significantly--forbidding his 
                                                 
41 1.3.17. 
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soldiers from plundering the city (1.1.20). He then turns to establishing a colonial network-
-Proconnesus, Perinthus, Selymbria, Chrysopolis, and then the rest of the Hellespont 
(1.1.19-22; 1.2.4, 15; 1.3.2-4, 8)--so as to obtain a stable flow of money and supplies. This 
indicates Alcibiades’ long-term goal: to make Cyzicus, and cities like it, into permanent 
and stable sources of supplies for Athens’ future needs. Xenophon thus shows Alcibiades 
concentrating on the re-establishment of a colonial network by which, in the future, the 
Athenians might quickly and systematically draw funds, just as the Persians are currently 
able to draw funds for themselves and the Spartans. By noting Alcibiades’ decision to 
colonize rather than pillage Cyzicus, Xenophon distinguishes Alcibiades’ imperial 
ambitions (Alcibiades is designing and installing an imperial architecture) from the 
ambitions of a mere pillager, who would seek only to plunder, and then to move-on.  
To appreciate fully Xenophon’s account of Alcibiades here, it is worth contrasting 
what Alcibiades is able to accomplish without an empire, with what the Spartans and the 
Persians accomplish with one. As Pharnabazus made clear in his promise to the Spartans, 
the chief advantage that the Persians have over Alcibiades is that they can make use of a 
long-established empire, which as such can quickly and systematically extract funds to 
supply its projects. In the case of Alcibiades, by contrast, time and energy spent collecting 
money through pillage and plunder is necessarily time and energy not spent fighting the 
Spartans and their confederates. Time spent gathering supplies, Xenophon thus suggests, 
is time away from using supplies. It is therefore all the more impressive that Alcibiades is 
able to establish colonies without having colonies already in Athens’ possession to fall 
 24 
back on—and, what is more, that he is able to establish these colonies while fighting the 
Spartans and the Persians all along. 
5. ALCIBIADES’ RETURN TO ATHENS AND THE QUESTION OF THE GODS 
 
In addition to his victories at Abydos and Cyzicus, Xenophon in Hellenica Book 
One shows Alcibiades trounce a combined Spartan-Persian force at Chalcedon (1.3.4-7); 
seize the city of Byzantium by betrayal (1.3.18-22); and acquire a massive treasure-trove 
from the Kerameios region (1.4.8-9). Consequently, Alcibiades is elected in absentia by 
the Athenians as their general. This action on the part of the Athenians Alcibiades, in turn, 
takes as a sign that the people are “well-disposed” (eunoun 1.4.12) toward him. So, having 
been sent for “in private” by his friends, he decides to make his return to the city.  
There is almost immediately a problem, however, when Alcibiades approaches 
Athens—a problem that calls to our attention an aspect of the Hellenica’s early chapters 
which is easily overlooked, namely Xenophon’s near-total silence regarding the gods. 
Thus, 
[Alcibiades] sailed into the Peiraius on the day when the city was celebrating the 
Plynteria (with the statue of Athena being covered42), which some prophesied 
(oionizonto) to be a bad omen, both for him and for the city. For, on this day, not 
one of the Athenians whatsoever (oudeis...oudenos) would dare to to undertake a 
serious deed (spoudaiou ergou) (1.4.12).  
 
                                                 
42 During the Plynteria (from plunein: to wash), the Athenians removed and cleaned the garb of the statue, 
“Athena Polias”; to preserve the goddess’ dignity in the meantime, they covered the statue with a tarp as well 
as surrounded it with a rope. See Robert Christopher Towneley Parker, "Plynteria," in Hornblower, Simon, 
Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press Leonhard Schmitz, 1996); "Plynteria," in 
Smith, William, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1870) 
928. See also Plutarch, Alcibiades. 
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Alcibiades’ grand return to Athens, no doubt a decisive stage in his imperial enterprise, is 
momentarily overshadowed by the Athenians’ pious concerns. How does Xenophon intend 
for us to understand these concerns? As some have noted, Xenophon leaves it unsaid 
whether Alcibiades knew that the Plynteria would be happening at the time of his return. 
On the grounds that it was unlikely Alcibiades, a prominent Athenian statesman, would 
have forgotten a major Athenian holiday, Helfer argues to this end that Alcibiades 
deliberately returned during the Plynteria, knowing the Athenians would be unwilling to 
take up arms against him at that time.43 If correct, this interpretation would confirm 
Alcibiades’ shrewdness and his competence as a political mind; for it would confirm 
Alcibiades’ foresight as well as his attentiveness to Athenian piety. What is more, as Helfer 
argues, it would prompt us to wonder whether Alcibiades had, since the days of his youthful 
indiscretions, become wiser—perhaps as a result of Socratic tutelage—concerning the deep 
attachments that political communities have to piety.44 
Though persuasive as far as it goes, this interpretation misses an obvious 
consideration. If Alcibiades knew the Plynteria would be happening when he returned, but 
decided that the Athenians would attend to the forbidden “serious business” of re-accepting 
him into the city anyway, this serves to confirm that Alcibiades unabashedly put human 
things—namely, Athenian politics and his place within them—above divine things, namely 
                                                 
43 “Socratic Characters,” 11-12. 
44 “Socratic Characters,” 7-14. A second, more conjectural, interpretation is that Alcibiades’ enemies, having 
learned the day when he would return, purposefully moved the festival from its normal day (which Alcibiades 
would have known and avoided) to the day of his return. In so doing, they would have made it seem, at least, 
that Alcibiades held the festival in low esteem, and that he hubristically assumed that the Athenians would 
attend to his affairs even on a day when they would normally devote themselves to the godess of their city: 
Athena. 
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attending to the goddess. And such a disregard for the gods would be deeply offensive to a 
pious believer, a fact Xenophon brings to our attention by explicitly pointing out that some 
of the Athenians “prophesied”45 that Alcibiades’ return would ruin himself and the city.  
6. ALCIBIADES’ ACCUSERS AND DEFENDERS 
 
This religious dark cloud, which Xenophon casts over Alcibiades at the decisive 
moment of his return to Athens, calls to our attention Xenophon’s remarkable silence in 
Books One and Two regarding divine things.46 By suddenly and unexpectedly raising the 
question whether there exist gods who might interfere in Alcibiades’ affairs—and Greek 
affairs, in general—Xenophon introduces a grave complication into the question of the 
goodness of Alcibiades’ imperial enterprise. For he indicates a tension between the view 
of those who prophesize Alcibiades’ and Athens’ downfall, on the one hand, and the 
seemingly favorable way in which he himself has portrayed Alcibiades, so far.  
Xenophon spotlights the conflict between these two views by next presenting 
speeches made by Alcibiades’ defenders and accusers at the time of his return to Athens. 
                                                 
45 Oionizomai means literally “to take omens from the flight and cries of birds”: Liddell and Scott 550. 
46 Like Thucydides, Xenophon in Books One and Two makes no mention of pre-battle sacrifices: Helfer, 
“Socratic Characters”; Strauss, “Greek Historians,” 663-664. In chapter two, Xenophon notes that “the 
temple of Athena in Phocaea was set on fire having been fallen upon by a hurricane” (1.3.1). Xenophon’s 
including this seemingly irrelevant detail here, together with the strange language he uses, inspire perplexity. 
Empitno (to fall upon:  See 2.2.14) is an archaic poetic verb used mostly in Attic tragedy. Aeschylus in the 
Agamemnon has the chorus use it to describe the actions of divine spirits (daimones:  See Liddell and Scott 
1167 and 1468). Additionally, Xenophon’s word for hurricane, prester, seems to have connoted divine 
punishments. Herodotus uses it when describing a storm that destroyed part of the Persian army when it was 
camping at the foot of Mt. Ida before invading Greece (Histories 7.42.2); and Hesiod uses it to describe the 
storm Zeus sent to destroy the monster Typhoeus (Theogony 846). Additionally, Xenophon mentions early 
in chapter one that the Spartan general Mindarus was in the middle of sacrificing to Athena when he decided 
to aid the Spartan forces under Doreius. Xenophon’s including this very precise detail is remarkable, given 
the imprecision with which he describes the events at the beginning of chapter one: We learn neither when 
nor where Thymochares and Agesandridas fight their battle, the first to be described in the Hellenica (1.1.1). 
 27 
Xenophon identifies neither of these views as his own. Rather, in the mouths of Alcibiades’ 
defenders, he places a persuasive, highly-pragmatic speech: 
Some of them said that he was the most capable (kratistos) of the citizens; that he 
alone was banished without just cause, but rather because he was plotted against by 
those who had less power than he and spoke less well and operated politically 
(politeuontōn) with a view to their own private gain, whereas he was always 
augmenting the common (to koinon), both by his own [power] and by the power of 
the city. (1.4.13-16) 
 
From Alcibiades’ accusers, by contrast, we hear this statement alone: “Others said that he 
alone had been responsible for their past evils, and there was the risk that he would be the 
leader (hegemon) of the evils that they feared would come about for the city” (1.4.17). The 
glaring disproportion between these two speeches as Xenophon presents them is consistent 
with Xenophon’s favorable depiction of Alcibiades’ military and political capacities. 
Indeed, if the accusers earnestly intended to rebut the defenders, they would seem to have 
misgauged. For, as Xenophon reports their speech, the accusers largely ignore the defense’s 
most compelling points: Alcibiades’ competence, the dubiousness of his original accusers, 
and the likelihood that he would seek honor for himself by advancing the common [good] 
of Athens. Likewise, they refrain from refuting the most questionable strand of the defense’ 
argument, namely that Alcibiades should not be blamed for betraying the Athenians to the 
Spartans. The best way to make sense of this disproportion is to assume that Alcibiades’ 
accusers consisted mainly of those Athenians who “prophesied” that Alcibiades would 
come to ruin. These might have regarded their own case as not being in need of elaboration, 
perhaps believing that Alcibiades’ past actions, together with his inauspicious return, were 
so obviously unjust and impious, that they should require no further explanation.  
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As we might expect, the relative strength of the argument made by Alcibiades’ 
defenders helps Alcibiades to succeed in his goal of becoming Athens’ head general. After 
presenting us with Alcibiades’ defenders and accusers, Xenophon shows us Alcibiades 
speaking to the Athenian “Council and Assembly”:  
[Alcibiades] defended himself (apologesamenos) on the grounds that he had not 
been impious, but rather, said that he had been done injustice; and other such things 
were argued. However, with no one contradicting them—since the Assembly would 
not have allowed it—he was elected autocratic leader. (hegemon autocrator 1.4.20)  
 
Xenophon notes that it was the Assembly (ecclesia), and not the Council (boulē), that 
Alcibiades spoke to—a crucial detail, considering the Council’s volatile reputation. (The 
Council is to execute four innocent generals roughly a year later, at the end of Book One: 
1.7.3.) Accordingly, Xenophon implies that whereas the Assembly was likely to forbid 
speeches attacking Alcibiades (“no one contradicted them, since the Assembly would not 
have allowed it”), the Council, by contrast, probably would have permitted such speeches.  
7. NOTIUM AND ALCIBIADES’ DISMISSAL 
 
Alcibiades secures his election, then, by means of skillful political maneuvering; 
he manages to avoid the more democratic, more hostile, of Athens’ two chambers. 
Nevertheless, at the time of Alcibiades’ appointment, there remain two looming questions 
on the horizon. (1) Given the enduring presence of a significant number of Athenians 
opposing Alcibiades, how stable is Alcibiades’ position as general? Moreover, (2) how do 
things stand for Alcibiades with respect to the gods? 
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Having left Notium to assist Thrasybulus at Phocaea, Alcibiades temporarily 
delegates his authority as general to Antiochos, whom he expressly orders not to attack 
Lysander’s fleet (1.5.11). Nevertheless, after an unspecified elapse of time, Antiochos sails 
out of Notium—with his own ship, plus one other—for the harbor of the Ephesians, where 
the Spartan fleet under Lysander lies in wait. Lysander immediately engages Antiochos; 
this, in turn, prompts the rest of the Athenians to come to Antiochos’ aid; and, in the 
resulting battle, the Athenians suffer a defeat.  
When the news of the defeat reaches Athens, the Athenians immediately dismiss 
Alcibiades. This is to say, within a single chapter, the Athenians literally reverse their 
judgment of Alcibiades: They go from lauding him as “the most capable (kratistos) of the 
citizens” (1.4.), to condemning him as “incapable” (akrateian 1.5.16) after the defeat at 
Notium. This reversal is doubly puzzling, for Xenophon makes clear that Alcibiades was 
by no means obviously responsible for the Athenian defeat at Notium, and, by the same 
token, that the defeat by no means revealed him as obviously incompetent.  
Rather, the result of Notium would seem only to reveal the dominant role of chance 
in human affairs. Consider the specific circumstances of the battle. Alcibiades judged it 
necessary to assist Thrasybulus at Phocaea, and so decided to leave his post at Notium 
temporarily. This we have seen him do before, on several occasions; yet nothing like the 
defeat at Notium occurred. At Chalcedon in 408 BCE, for example, Alcibiades delegates 
power to his generals while he “goes to the Hellespont and the Chersonese in order to 
demand money” (1.3.8). In his absence, the generals make an agreement with 
Pharnabazus—one which Alcibiades promptly renegotiates upon his return (1.3.11-12). 
 30 
(One wonders what might have happened during Alcibiades’ absence had Pharnabazus 
initiated an attack, instead of “waiting in Chalcedon until Alcibiades should return from 
Byzantium” (1.3.11), or worse, if the Persians had sent a shrewder, more aggressive 
general, like Cyrus the Younger.47) Accordingly, at Notium, Alcibiades judged that 
Antiochos was the general most fit to command in his stead. Of course, we might 
reasonably question whether Thrasybulus’ business was in fact more pressing, just as we 
might reasonably question whether Alcibiades really needed to abandon Chalcedon in 
order to demand money from the Hellespont and Chersonese. And we might also wonder 
whether Antiochos was as trustworthy as Alcibiades believed him to be, just as we might 
question Alcibiades’ decision to delegate to the generals at Chalcedon. Yet in both of these 
episodes, Xenophon gives no indication that Alcibiades was acting in a particularly 
reckless or careless manner. Rather, taking such risks would seem to come with the 
territory of operating in the daring, aggressive manner characteristic of Alcibiades. 
As we have seen in the course of our analysis, then, Alcibiades took countless other 
risks without suffering any comparable outcome. The very man who jumped ships after 
learning he had been condemned in Athens; who double-crossed the Spartans, the Persians, 
and the Athenians at the same time; who allegedly seduced and impregnated the wife of 
the king of Sparta, while living in Sparta after having been condemned to death by the 
Athenians;48 who escaped on horseback by moonlight from a Persian prison—this man lost 
everything through a routine delegation of power! 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Anabasis Book One. 
48 Alcibiades was rumored to have fathered a future contender for the Spartan kingship, one Leotychidas, 
having impregnated Timaea, the wife of Agis. Xenophon has his Agesilaus allude to this rumor when he 
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8. XENOPHON’S JUDGMENT OF ALCIBIADES    
 
If Alcibiades was in fact the most capable of the citizens, as Xenophon suggests in 
his depiction, and as many of the Athenians declared him to be, then why did he come to 
ruin so abruptly? Does not his failure at Notium, and with the Athenian demos, in effect 
prove or reveal his incompetence? According to this view, Alcibiades’ downfall must have 
been the result of some error, which a more capable man would have avoided. As we have 
seen, however, Alcibiades’ proven ability to restore Athenian power and prestige against 
all odds—that is, in the face of a Persian-funded Sparta—undercuts the view that his defeat 
at Notium somehow revealed his latent incompetence. As Xenophon depicts him in Books 
One and Two, Alcibiades would seem to possess many, if not all, of the qualities necessary 
for restoring the Athenian empire, and then expanding it substantially. Furthermore, by 
taking seriously the possibility that Alcibiades is the most capable of all the Athenians—
perhaps even of all the Greeks—Xenophon encourages his readers to consider whether 
Alcibiades is in some sense worthy of empire, and whether an empire capable of 
conquering Persia might benefit the Greeks in an important way. 
The two most plausible explanations of Alcibiades’ fall, which I have attempted to 
sketch out on the basis of Xenophon’s account, let me now attempt to summarize. First, 
the unexpected failure of the most impressive statesman of the Hellenica’s first two books 
points not to some buried tactical error on that man’s part, but rather, to the unfathomable 
                                                 
contends with Leotychidas over the kingship: see 3.3.2. See also Plutarch, “Alcibiades,” 23.7-8, and 
“Agesilaus,” 3.1-2; Marincola, Landmark, 96 n. 3.2.2 a., ad loc.  
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degree to which human affairs are governed by chance, i.e., by necessities that are beyond 
our ability to anticipate. According to this view, there is definite limit to man’s capacity to 
order his affairs. Precisely what this limit is, however, is extremely difficult to say; and 
human affairs consequently remain unpredictable.  
The second plausible explanation is that Alcibiades came to premature ruin, not as 
a result of blind necessities which we could not reasonably expect him to have foreseen, 
but rather, through his impious conduct towards the gods. By mentioning the unpropitious 
circumstances of Alcibiades’ return, Xenophon encourages his pious readers to doubt 
whether Alcibiades’ successes and return to Athens in fact bode well for the city. Indeed, 
he would seem to be prompting his readers to wonder if political and military greatness are 
not in deep tension with the demands of piety and attentiveness to the gods. As we recall, 
in describing Alcibiades’ return, Xenophon depicts the Athenians as having to choose 
between “serious business” (calling assemblies in both legislative chambers to hear 
Alcibiades and to decide whether to elect him head general) and attending to the gods 
(setting aside serious business and honoring “Athena Polias”). The gods as the city 
understands them (i.e., the gods in the perspective of conventional piety) sometimes 
demand that men, to prove their reverence, set aside precisely what the city needs—
precisely what men regard as most humanly “serious.” One thinks, for example, of Nicias’ 
insistence that the Athenians, during their retreat from Syracuse, throw strategy to the 
winds and wait “thrice-nine days” at Syracuse in accordance with the diviners’ commands. 
Accordingly, for the Athenians, such pious devotion would entail setting aside the quest to 
restore the power of the city by means of Alcibiades—a quest which, as we have seen, 
 33 
depends on rapid execution in order to succeed. The dictates of piety would therefore seem 
to be in deep tension with the Athenians’ pursuit of the serious business of political 
greatness.  
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III. Thrasybulus 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Thrasybulus of Steiria, we find an empire-seeker of a different kind. Alcibiades, 
as we have seen, remained suspiciously silent regarding the gods and struggled 
continuously with the Athenian demos. Thrasybulus, by contrast, embraces the demos, is 
embraced, in turn, and claims that the gods fight on his side. Yet Thrasybulus, like 
Alcibiades before him, steps on the Hellenica’s scene when Athens is in crisis. We thus 
wonder if he, with his particular mode of imperialism different from Alcibiades’, will 
succeed where Alcibiades failed.  
In the wake of its crushing defeat at Aegospotami, without the counsel of 
Alcibiades, faced with the formidable Spartan general, Lysander, and burdened with the 
fear that its downfall was somehow divinely orchestrated—Athens at the beginning of 
Hellenica Book Two is at its lowest ebb. As the Athenians themselves express, it is likely 
that they, the former terror of Greece’s “little cities” (micropolitas), will now suffer 
precisely what the little cities, such as Melos, once suffered “unjustly” at the hands of the 
Athenians (2.2.10). Athens ultimately avoids this grim fate, through Sparta’s remarkable 
intervention: “The Lacedaemonians asserted that they would not enslave the Greek city 
that had worked toward a great good during the greatest dangers that had ever arisen 
(genomenois) for Greece” (2.2.20).  
Consequently, as Xenophon periodically reminds us in the remainder of the 
Hellenica, Athens remains eager to regain its former empire (3.5.1-2, 3.5.10, and 3.5.16). 
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However, as we might well conclude on the basis of Chapter One above, such a comeback 
appears unlikely without an Alcibiades at Athens’ helm. For as we saw in the Hellenica’s 
opening chapters, the course that Greek affairs will take seems likely to hinge on the fate 
of Alcibiades. Do Athens’ retained ambitions, then, amount to little more than delusions 
of grandeur?  
The answer to this question depends, I argue in this chapter, crucially on the 
imperial ambitions of Thrasybulus, an Athenian general and democratic statesman whose 
remarkable career is, unlike that of Alcibiades, easily overlooked. Thrasybulus appears in 
Greek affairs only sporadically, Xenophon’s account of him consisting of multiple distinct 
narratives, separated from each other by a considerable number of years. In the first of 
these narratives, Thrasybulus, in 403 BCE, leads a successful rebellion against the Spartan 
military junta at Athens, known in the Hellenica as the “Thirty Oligarchs,” after which he 
manages to restore Athens’ democratic regime. Then, roughly thirteen years later (from 
390-389 BCE), Thrasybulus reappears as the leader of a brief, wondrous, yet ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt at reestablishing the Athenian empire. Thrasybulus thus stands at the 
helm of Athens at that city’s critical moments. By overthrowing the Thirty and 
reestablishing democracy, he liberates Athens from Spartan domination, restores it as a 
contender in Greek affairs, and purposefully lays the groundwork for a renewed Athenian 
empire. Moreover, by reinitiating Athenian imperial expansion in 390-389 BCE—only to 
be killed unexpectedly during a routine mission—Thrasybulus effectively decides the fate 
of Athens and its role as an empire in Greece. For after Thrasybulus’ failed 390-389 
campaign, Athens never again makes a serious attempt to restore its empire. Had 
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Thrasybulus succeeded in this campaign, it is probable that Athens might have finally 
achieved the imperial ambitions it nurtured under Alcibiades, and under Alcibiades’ great 
imperial predecessors, Miltiades and Themistocles.  
2. THRASYBULUS AND ALCIBIADES 
 
Thrasybulus makes several important contributions to events described in the final 
chapters of Thucydides’ work, as well as in the Hellenica’s early chapters. In the former, 
Thrasybulus organizes a coup against the Oligarchy of the 400,49 thereby establishing 
himself as one of the leading men of Athens’ democratic faction—a role he will continue 
to play in the Hellenica. Additionally, both Thucydides and Xenophon note Thrasybulus’ 
effective, albeit ancillary, role as a general in Alcibiades’ campaigns for Athens at the end 
of the Peloponnesian War. Perhaps most importantly, however, Thrasybulus lobbies on 
multiple occasions in Athens for the return of the exiled Alcibiades.50 In so doing, 
Thrasybulus evinces remarkable statesmanship: As a committed democrat, Thrasybulus 
would have been politically at odds with the anti-democratic Alcibiades.51 Thrasybulus 
was sufficiently shrewd to recognize that the future of Athens as a strong, independent, 
imperial city depended in part on Alcibiades; he was a partisan of the demos who discerned 
that the future security of the demos depended on a man whom the demos regarded as “one 
who desired tyranny” (hōs turannidos epithumoūnti).52 
                                                 
49 Thucydides 8.73-76. 
50 8.81 and 8.98. 
51 See, e.g., Thucydides 6.15.4. See also Proietti, Xenophon’s Sparta, 109; Michael Palmer, Love of Glory 
and the Common Good (Landham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992).  
52 Thucydides 6.15.4. 
 37 
Thrasybulus thus emerges at the end of the Peloponnesian War as a kind of bridge 
between the two characteristic aspects of Athens which often threaten to undermine one 
another: its democratic government and its imperial ambitions. And so it is no surprise that 
both of Thrasybulus’ two shining moments—his role in the revolt from the Thirty, and his 
attempt at reestablishing the empire—confirm his capacities and ambitions as, respectively, 
a democratic statesman and an imperialist. And, as we shall see, his capacities (both 
political and military) in both of these moments at least appear to be proportional to his 
ambitions—a characterization which cannot be attributed to most of the Hellenica’s 
characters.53 Consequently, all the more shocking—and perhaps, disappointing—is 
Thrasybulus’ sudden fall from power, which, as I will suggest, appears to be fortuitous and 
so in no way a reflection of incompetence on Thrasybulus’ part. Thrasybulus’ ignominious 
downfall, like Alcibiades’, seems to have been calculated by Xenophon to achieve two 
aims: (1) frustrate the high expectations we have built up in studying Thrasybulus’ ascent, 
and, in response to these frustrations, (2) prompt us to investigate its causes and 
significance. 
Xenophon informs us that Thrasybulus, a full general at the time of his participation 
in Alcibiades’ campaign, was only a trierarch at the battle of Argenusai (1.6.35).54 Since 
that battle took place after Alcibiades had been exiled the second time, for the Athenian 
loss at Notium (see 1.5.17, and Chapter Two, above); and since Thrasybulus must have 
                                                 
53 Our examination of Thymochares, Mindarus, Doreius, and Agesandridas at the beginning of the last 
chapter suggests this. 
54 See Peter Krentz, “The Argenusai Affair,” in The Landmark Hellenica, 317-321. 
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been well know in Athens as a supporter of Alcibiades (having advocated for his recall), it 
is likely that Thrasybulus was demoted on account of his proximity to, and his obvious 
appreciation for, Alcibiades.55  
Xenophon corroborates Thrasybulus’ proximity to Alcibiades in Theramenes’ trial 
by the Thirty Oligarchs. Theramenes, for his part, was originally a member of the Spartan-
appointed Thirty (2.3.2); but when he refused to participate in the oligarchy’s most 
rapacious exploits, initiated by Critias, Theramenes was in turn prosecuted by Critias and 
the rest of the Thirty, for betraying the oligarchy’ cause. One of the Thirty’s charges against 
Theramenes was that he had refused to participate in precisely those acts that were 
necessary to solidify the oligarchy. Theramenes retorted by questioning whether the 
measures Critias and his followers were following were actually prudent; to this effect, he 
cited the exiles, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, as men who could pose a threat to the Thirty’s 
rule as “capable leaders of the many” (plēthei hegemones hikanoi 2.3.43). Now this remark 
makes it sound as if Alcibiades and Thrasybulus had been exiled en bloc; in fact, however, 
roughly two years had elapsed between the time of Alcibiades’ exile, after Notium (406 
BCE), and Thrasybulus’ exile, which must have taken place sometime56 between Athens’ 
decision to capitulate to the Spartans and the formation of the Thirty, both of which events 
took place in 404 BCE.  
This detail leads us to a second, and more significant, inaccuracy in Theramenes’ 
statement, namely the political motivations of the respective exiles. Alcibiades, as we 
                                                 
55 See Landmark, 412. 
56 Xenophon, interestingly, does not tell us the circumstances of Thrasybulus’ exile, only that he was exiled: 
see Landmark, 412. 
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recall, had been exiled in absentia by “the Athenians.” And Xenophon, as we also recall, 
there refrains from specifying which, if any, particular faction within Athens sought 
Alcibiades’ removal. However, the fact that “the Athenians” in question immediately 
replaced Alcibiades and his staff with, among others, the notorious democratic partisan, 
Konon,57 suggests that the democratic, anti-oligarchic (and hence, anti-Alcibiadian) faction 
was a major player in the decision. Alcibiades’ second exile would therefore seem to have 
been, to no small extent, democratically motivated. By contrast, the exile of Thrasybulus, 
which coincided with the capitulation of the democracy to Sparta and the rise of the 
oligarchic Thirty, would seem to have been decidedly anti-democratic in motivation. It was 
the oligarchic faction within Athens that must have chosen soon-to-be member of the 
Thirty, Theramenes, to negotiate a surrender with the Spartans (2.2.17).  
Theramenes’ conflation of these details concerning Alcibiades and Thrasybulus 
suggest that Thrasybulus was perceived by his fellow Athenians as closely associated with 
Alcibiades. Theramenes thus groups Thrasybulus together with Alcibiades as two 
examples of “capable leaders” who, as such, are likely to pose a threat to the Thirty if 
disaffected. This is high praise of Thrasybulus, indeed, considering Alcibiades’ 
tremendous capacities displayed in Book One. What is more, Theramenes’ wariness of 
Thrasybulus as a potential threat comparable to Alcibiades presages the decisive role 
Thrasybulus will in fact play in effectively overthrowing the Thirty. By the same token, 
Theramenes’ pointing to Thrasybulus as a potential leader of the people suggests that 
                                                 
57 Robin Seager, “Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B. C.,” The Journal of Hellenic 
Studies 87 (1967): 95-115. 
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Thrasybulus had, at this point, established a reputation for himself in Athens as one of the 
city’s foremost democratic statesmen.  
3. LEADER AT PHULE: THRASYBULUS’ DEMOCRATIC REVOLT AGAINST THE THIRTY 
 
At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Thirty Oligarchs far surpassed any single 
faction within Athens, which, as a whole, had been decimated both by defeat in battle and 
by plague and starvation at the end of the Peloponnesian War (2.2). Moreover, shortly after 
coming to power, the Thirty requested from Sparta, and received, a contingent of hoplites 
to help secure their rule (2.3.14). The Thirty then used these hoplites as personal assassins 
to begin systematically executing those men of Athens whom they regarded as “least likely 
to accept being pushed aside and kept out of public life” (2.3.14). And once they had 
executed Theramenes, the Thirty evicted from Athens, and seized the property of, all the 
Athenians not part of the three-thousand “gentlemen” (kaloi kagathoi) whom the Thirty 
had chosen to bestow favors on (2.4). As a result, many Athenian refugees fled to nearby 
Thebes and Megara (2.4.1).  
We can only imagine the degraded, defeated state of mind of the Athenian refugees 
at the time of the Thirty’s ascent to power. Dispersed and property-less in foreign cities, it 
was probably tempting for most of these refugees simply to assimilate into their new 
surroundings, and to eschew any attempt at recapturing Athens. And, with the Thirty 
having put to death many of the most public-spirited, ambitious men not allied with 
themselves, it would seem all the less likely that the exiles would find men among 
themselves sufficiently daring and intelligent to recapture their city. This, then, is the vivid 
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picture that Xenophon paints for us at the beginning of Thrasybulus’ campaign against the 
Thirty. That campaign begins in the following way. Thrasybulus, who had temporarily 
resettled in Thebes, one day “set out from [that city] with seventy men, and seized Phule, 
a fortress with a commanding position” (2.4.2). It is telling of the temper of the dispersed 
Athenians that, of the thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—that would have ended up 
as refugees in Thebes, only seventy were willing at first to join Thrasybulus’ campaign. It 
is equally telling, however, that Thrasybulus dared to undertake such a campaign. For 
seventy exiles to take on the largest city in Greece—even if that city has been crippled by 
war, both foreign and civil—is an astonishingly bold undertaking.  
What enterprise does Thrasybulus here envision? Xenophon begins to answer this 
question in the paragraphs that follow (2.4.2-7). Thrasybulus evidently intends to use Phule 
as a wedge by means of which to reopen the city for himself and the democrats. His wedge, 
in turn, begins to work when the Thirty attempt to retake Phule, having brought with them 
the Three-Thousand, as well as the cavalry (2.4.2). Vastly outnumbering their enemies, the 
Thirty no doubt anticipate a speedy and decisive outcome. Xenophon even notes, in the 
same compound sentence in which he lists the military forces that the Thirty bring with 
them to Phule, that “the day was surpassingly beautiful” (2.4.2). The Thirty perhaps regard 
the beauty of the day, together with their overwhelmingly superior forces, as a kind of 
cosmic promise of their assured success over their enemies. Accordingly, as we might 
expect, the sunny confidence that fills their ranks causes some of the Thirty’s forces 
immediately to rush headlong at the fortress—evidently without forethought: 
“Immediately, some of the boldest of the young men charged at the fortress.” Things 
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quickly turn sour, however: “But they achieved (epoiesan) nothing, and they sustained 
injuries” (2.4.2-3 my italics). The Thirty’s heedlessness here recalls the initial confusion 
and absence of vision which Xenophon depicts at the Hellenica’s opening. 
At this point, things only get worse for the Thirty. After their initial defeat, they 
take no further action on the beautiful day on which they arrived, instead “wishing” 
(boulomenon) to lay siege to Phule, so as to starve it from supplies (2.4.2). Yet they fail to 
start work on the day of their arrival, evidently believing that there is no need for them to 
act quickly. They must have anticipated seizing the fortress through their initial charge; 
and consequently, when their attempt failed, they were forced to pursue a plan (laying 
siege) which they initially wished to avoid.  
Their subsequent decision to wait proves, however, to be the undoing of their entire 
campaign: “Snow came upon them (epigignetai)58 for the entire (pamplethes) night, and 
into the next day. So the men who were being snowed-upon (hoi niphomenoi) went away 
into their city [Athens], having lost many of their baggage carriers to the men of Phule” 
(2.4.3). There is irony in Xenophon’s words here, for not only do the Thirty, who massively 
outnumbered their enemy, fail even to begin walling off the fortress; they also end up losing 
most of their supplies to precisely the men whom they intended to deprive of supplies by 
laying siege. What is more, after an ignominious retreat, the Thirty realize that their country 
houses in the countryside surrounding Phule are likely to be plundered by the forces of 
Thrasybulus. In what would seem to be a comically-oligarchic version of Pericles’ famous 
                                                 
58 Epigignomai can also have the sense of “attack.”  
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decision to donate his country houses to the city of Athens, lest the Spartans choose not to 
plunder them during their invasion of Attica,59 the Thirty send out from Athens the Spartan 
contingent of hoplites (originally given to them by Lysander) to guard their country estates 
from the exiles at Phule. 
Now the effect that Thrasybulus’ astonishing repulsion of the Thirty has on the 
Athenian exiles is a massive one. To continue our previous metaphor, Thrasybulus 
succeeds at Phule in firmly securing his wedge into Athens; it now remains for him to apply 
the requisite pressure. Xenophon thus begins the very next paragraph by informing us that 
“already (ede) there were around seven-hundred men gathered at Phule” (2.4.5 my italics). 
This rapid tenfold increase of the number of Athenian exiles at Phule confirms that, given 
the right conditions, Thrasybulus needed to accomplish just the right daring feat in order 
to stir the spirits of the Athenian exiles. Xenophon thus spotlights the explosive effects that 
can emanate from a single, seemingly insignificant military event. Accordingly, the 
relevance of this insight to imperial ambition is obvious enough: Given the right mixture 
of talent, shrewdness, and luck, a single man with a few soldiers might multiply his military 
and political power exponentially through a handful of battles.  
In the passages that follow, Xenophon shows Thrasybulus putting this insight to 
use. Having assembled seven-hundred exiles in the fortress, and having thereby established 
his wedge into Athens, Thrasybulus initiates the next stage of his campaign against the 
Thirty. (It is important to note here that, just as we saw in the case of Alcibiades in Chapter 
                                                 
59 Thucydides 2.13.1. 
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Two, it is Thrasybulus, and not his enemy, who initiates each stage of this campaign.) Just 
as Thrasybulus moved first by seizing Phule, now he moves first by attacking the Thirty’s 
Spartan guards encamped outside Phule. This attack he plans after having observed that, 
each morning,60 there is a time when the Spartans are off their guard, each attending to his 
own affairs (2.4.5). Having observed this pattern, Thrasybulus accordingly initiates a 
sudden attack, precisely when the Spartans (whose contingent far outnumbers the seven-
hundred man Athenian force) least expect it. In the ensuing rout, several Spartan cavalry 
and more than one hundred and twenty hoplites are killed; Xenophon mentions no Athenian 
casualties (2.4.6-7).      
Here, as with the initial defeat of the Thirty at Phule, the extent of the physical 
damage sustained by the Thirty is far exceeded by the moral damage: “After this, the Thirty 
no longer believed that their affairs (sphisi ta pragmata) were secure (asphale 2.4.8).”61  
By implication, the Thirty up until this point had regarded their affairs as secure, both by 
their own numerical superiority, and by the Spartans assigned to guard them. They are thus 
astonished, and shaken, by the capacity of Thrasybulus and his men to make war 
effectively—a fact Xenophon draws our attention to by noting, rather perplexingly, that 
among the cavalrymen killed by Thrasybulus’ men was one Nicostratus, “called ‘the 
noble’” (2.4.6). Perhaps, like Nicostratus, the Thirty and their three-thousand supporters 
(the self-proclaimed gentlemen or “noble and good”) regarded their own (professed) 
nobility as a source of protection from an ignominious fate. The undignified fate of the 
                                                 
60 Xenophon uses progressive verbs in this sentence, indicating both that the Spartans repeated this sequence 
of events daily, and that Thrasybulus espied them repeating it daily. 
61 Literally: “immovable.” 
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“noble” Nicostratus—struck down at dawn while having his horse rubbed down (2.4.6)—
accordingly illustrates the distressing fragility of noble men, and the inability of their 
nobility to protect them. 
With their confidence crushed and their forces considerably weakened, the Thirty 
proceed now to establish a private residence for themselves in the nearby town of Eleusis, 
“so that there might be a place for them to flee to, if it were necessary” (2.4.8). With this 
action, the Thirty concede the (likely) possibility that their rule in Athens will come to an 
end, perhaps as a direct result of the rebellion instigated by Thrasybulus. This is a 
remarkable concession, since, even if Thrasybulus’ numbers are growing rapidly as a result 
of his victory, still, at least physically speaking, the Thirty’s numerical superiority—three-
thousand “kaloi kagathoi,” together with the remainder of Lysander’s Spartan 
contingent—would seem to assure the Thirty’s safety or security (asphale). Their sudden 
implementation of this contingency plan, Xenophon suggests, bespeaks their felt inferiority 
to Thrasybulus’ forces. The effect of Xenophon’s depiction of the Thirty, then, is to suggest 
that a dramatic shift has occurred with respect to the strength and impetus of the two sides; 
without quite understanding it, we somehow discern—as do the Thirty themselves—that, 
despite their retained numerical superiority, the balances have shifted, and that Thrasybulus 
and his followers now stand in the position of resurgence.  
4. JUSTICE AND THE GODS: THRASYBULUS’ SPEECH AT PIRAEUS 
 
Whether this felt shift is a result of merely human hopes and expectations; or, 
alternatively, if there is something super-human at work on Thrasybulus’ behalf, 
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Thrasybulus himself explicitly addresses in his speech to the Athenian exiles before their 
invasion of Piraeus. His speech here—his first in the Hellenica, and the longest pre-battle 
exhortation in the work—is a deeply moving one, evidently calculated by Xenophon to 
cause us to admire Thrasybulus. Accordingly, Xenophon here reproduces no speech of 
Critias, or of any of the Thirty. He clearly intends Thrasybulus to be the focus of our 
attention, and perhaps, of our hopes. 
The context of his speech is tense and dramatic. After the Thirty had seized Eleusis, 
Thrasybulus set out with one-thousand men from Phule to invade the port of Athens, 
Piraeus. (From this, we gather that within four days,62 the seven-hundred exiles at Phule—
originally only 70—had swelled to over a thousand men.) After Thrasybulus seized the 
port, the Thirty (again, slow to act) set out to recapture it, “taking the wagon road from 
Athens to Piraeus” (2.4.10). Thrasybulus in turn attempted to prevent the Thirty from even 
entering the town; but when he discovered his numbers were insufficient, he had the exiles 
“form in close order” (sunepeirathesan)—i.e., deliberately, and not in a chaotic retreat—
at the hill of Mounichia, within Peiraieus (2.4.11). With the Athenians occupying the higher 
ground (the Thirty will be forced to try to take the hill), Thrasybulus gives a lengthy oration 
“from the middle” of the army (2.4.12). 
Thrasybulus’ speech exhorts the Athenians, who have been forced out of their city 
without having done anything unjust to deserve it (2.4.14), to recapture their “fatherland,” 
and with it, “our homes, our freedom, our honors,63 our children, and—for those of us who 
                                                 
62 See 2.4.13. 
63 Or, perhaps, “offices” (timas).  
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have them—our wives” (2.4.17). The speech has a moral logic at its core, as is manifest 
from the above quotations. On the one hand, the Athenians have been unjustly deprived of 
their city, and everything that goes with it, by contemptible men: Thrasybulus mocks 
Thirty’s Spartan allies as the ones whom they defeated in battle “four days ago,” outside 
of Phule. To this end, Thrasybulus emphasizes the retributive dimension of his speech, by 
noting that he and his allies have been “praying” constantly for an opportunity to face the 
Thirty and their followers in battle. Thus, Thrasybulus and his followers seek to recapture 
what is their own; but they also wish to punish those who unjustly took it from them: This 
is the first component of his speech, whose noble, high-minded character he underlines 
with these quasi-Periclean concluding words: “Even someone who is slain here will be 
happy (eudaimon); for no one, however wealthy, could make such a noble memorial” 
(mnemeiou 2.4.17).64 This is a remarkable promise: Even in death, one who lays down his 
life in service of recapturing Athens will be happy. The goods that come from recapturing 
the city and enjoying it in life, then, are not the only goods that Thrasybulus believes the 
Athenians should seek in fighting this battle. Recapturing the city and punishing the Thirty 
is so noble, we might venture to say, that it is worth dying for. 
This elevated promise of happiness brings us to the second component of 
Thrasybulus’ speech. Thrasybulus, as we noted above, lists six goals the exiles are pursuing 
in invading Athens. The first two items—fatherland and homes—concern places of 
dwelling. Yet whereas homes belong to individual men and families within the city, the 
                                                 
64 Cf. Thucydides 2.43.2-5. 
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fatherland points to something in common, as well as something ancestral (Thrasybulus 
could have said “city,” instead). The last two items—children and wives—have more in 
common with “homes” than with “the fatherland,” for Thrasybulus even chooses to 
mention that some of the exiles do not have children, or wives, or both. Homes, children, 
and wives, then, might be part of the fatherland, but they are not held in common the way 
the fatherland is. Similarly, they are more tangible than the fatherland; they are goods that 
the individual men with Thrasybulus can enjoy in an obvious, non-abstract way. By the 
same token, however, being less abstract and more individual, it would make less sense for 
a man to be willing to die for another man’s home, children, and wife, than it would for 
him to die for a fatherland, which he and his fellow citizens share in common. Accordingly, 
just as the last two items on the list—“children and wives”—have more in common with 
the second item—“homes”—similarly, the middle two items—“freedom and honors”—
would seem to be closer to “fatherland.” Both are elevated goals which individual men, as 
well as whole cities, pursue; moreover, they are goals that have a core moral and political 
significance: A serious citizen would probably say that both freedom and honors are, like 
the fatherland, ends that one might nobly die for. It would perhaps make more sense (in the 
context of Thrasybulus’ exhortation to be willing to die nobly fighting to recapture Athens) 
to cite the fatherland, freedom, and honors—rather than homes, children, and wives—as 
objects worth dying for. Additionally, “freedom and honors” capture the twin aspects of 
Athens with which Thrasybulus has revealed himself to be concerned: the democracy and 
the empire. As the leading statesman of Athens’ democratic faction, Thrasybulus would 
value freedom; and as an ambitious imperialist, Thrasybulus would be concerned with 
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“honors.” 
The third component of Thrasybulus’ speech is entwined with the first two: the 
emphasis which he places on the gods. In the order of ideas in the speech, Thrasybulus 
asserts the justice of the exiles (who were forcibly removed by the Thirty), as well as the 
shamefaced injustice of the Thirty. It is on the basis of this position that Thrasybulus 
proceeds to speak of the gods, announcing that he and his followers have been “always 
praying” (aei euchometha) to be able to face the Thirty in battle (2.4.13-14). The gods, 
accordingly, have answered their prayers: Thrasybulus asserts boldly that “the gods...now 
manifestly (phaneros) are fighting as allies (summachousi) for our advantage” (2.4.14).65 
On this score, he proclaims that the snowstorm--which, as we saw, played a decisive role 
in enabling the men at Phule to fend off the Thirty--was sent by the gods (2.4.14). Likewise, 
he points to the present battle positions of the Thirty as evidence of providence: “Even 
now, [the gods] have brought us into an area in which our enemies will not be able to throw 
spears or javelins, on account of the steep ascent” (2.4.15). This is an interesting belief to 
maintain, in light of Xenophon’s description of how the battle-location came to be 
determined. Thrasybulus’ forces at first tried to prevent the Thirty from entering the Piraeus 
at all, having initially seized the town. Only when the exiles discovered that they would be 
unable to form a sufficient defense of the town did Thrasybulus order them to occupy the 
hill at Mounichia, from where he delivers his pre-battle oration. Thrasybulus, who seems 
to be earnest in his beliefs, perhaps sees the gods’ providence at work in the rather 
                                                 
65 Xenophon has Cyrus express the same view of the gods—namely, that they are his allies—in the Education 
of Cyrus. 
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fortuitous way the exiles came to occupy the hill—which, as he correctly anticipates, turns 
out to be the superior battle position. Originally intending to defend the whole Piraeus from 
the Thirty, Thrasybulus learns only after the fact that such a defense would be numerically 
impossible, given the size of the area to be defended.  
What this realization on his part betrays, however, is a lack of foresight on 
Thrasybulus’ part. At the least, we can say that Thrasybulus failed to anticipate how he 
would defend the Piraeus once he had managed to capture it. This suggests that 
Thrasybulus attacked the Piraeus in a spell of overconfidence, without having considered 
its logistics. If so, then his occupation of Mounichia would seem to be nothing more than 
good luck following from poor calculation. If Thrasybulus himself is to believed, however, 
it was in fact a divine plan—and not the result of a lapse in human judgment on his own 
part—that brought the exiles to occupy the superior ground. Or, more precisely, what 
appears at first to be a tactical error turns out, in the fullness of time, to have in fact been 
orchestrated by the gods.  
After the Athenians’ “divination” in Book One,66 Thrasybulus’ providential view 
here stands as the boldest and most articulate announcement of what me might call the 
providential or divine understanding of Greek affairs. Xenophon for his part makes it clear 
that Thrasybulus’ tremendous confidence in the role played by the gods in the exiles’ 
affairs goes together with a tremendous confidence in the justice of the exiles’ campaign 
against the Thirty.  
                                                 
66 See Chapter Two, above. 
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5. THE FALL OF THE THIRTY AND THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY 
 
 Whether or not the gods actually fought together with them, the exiles were 
nevertheless victorious over the Thirty, whose army was destroyed, and many of whose 
leaders (including the arch-tyrant, Critias) were slain (2.4.19). As a result of their defeat at 
Piraeus, the remainder of the Thirty are forced out of Athens into exile in Eleusis, their 
supporters in Athens (the Three-Thousand) having decided to replace the Thirty, by means 
of election, with ten new magistrates (2.4.23-24). These, in turn, “attended the [affairs] of 
the town (astei)” (2.4.24). The replacement of the Thirty by the Ten does not lead 
immediately to a reconciliation between the exiles and the “men of the city,” however. For 
many of those who remained in Athens, having refused to go into exile, were complicit in 
the Thirty’s crimes against their fellow citizens, not the least of which included seizing 
property, and killing political dissidents such as Theramenes (2.4.23). Consequently, the 
men at Athens and the men of the Piraeus continue to prosecute the Athenian civil war well 
after the capitulation of the Thirty (2.4.24-38). A fuller treatment of the Hellenica would 
need to examine Xenophon’s intricate account of how the Athenian civil war was finally 
concluded. Given our more limited purposes here, of understanding Thrasybulus as an 
ambitious empire-seeker, we will confine ourselves in fleshing out Thrasybulus’ role in the 
restoration of Athens’ imperial democracy. 
At the close of Book Two, which is also the close of the civil war at Athens, 
Thrasybulus asserts in a stirring speech that the conflict between the exiles and the men of 
the city was a conflict between competing regimes. Addressing the men of the city, 
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Thrasybulus scolds them for having acted unjustly toward “the people” (demos 2.4.40). 
More importantly, Thrasybulus asserts that the final resolution of the war revealed or 
confirmed the moral, political, and military superiority of the demos over the few, and 
hence, its just claim to rule. Paraphrasing the Delphic exhortation, he contends:  
You men of the town, I advise you to know yourselves; and you would most know 
yourselves if you attempted to sum up (analogisaisthe) that on account of which 
you pride yourselves (mega phroneteon), such that you attempt to rule us. Perhaps 
you are more just [than us]? Yet, the demos is poorer than you, but it did not ever 
(popote) commit injustice against you for the sake of money (heneca chrematon). 
But you, the wealthiest of all, have done (pepoiekate) many and shameful [things] 
for the sake of gain (kerdeon). So, since you do not maintain righteousness 
(dikaiosunes), perhaps you pride yourselves on account of your manliness. And 
what occasion (krisis) would be nobler for this than how we fought against each 
other? Yet you assert that you have judgement (gnome)--[you] who had walls and 
arms and money and the Lacedaemonians as allies, were thwarted by ones who had 
none of these. You pride yourselves on account of the Lacedaemonians? How, 
when, just as [people] tie-up snapping dogs and hand them over, so those men 
handed you over to this demos—to whom you have done injustice—and then 
picked up and left. (2.4.40-42) 
 
Thrasybulus’ speech constitutes an indictment of the non-democratic factions of Athens as 
unfit for rule. By Thrasybulus’ account, the demos surpasses its counterparts on the whole 
spectrum of the virtues: justice, manliness, shrewdness of judgement, and patriotism. This 
is proved, Thrasybulus contends, by the sequence of actions on the Thirty’s part that 
precipitated their own downfall—their executions and property-confiscations of decent 
Athenians—as well as by their defeat by the democrats, who proved themselves superior 
(despite their inferior circumstances). 
 Is this understanding of events warranted by Xenophon’s depiction of them? As we 
noted above, Xenophon himself never weighs in on the question of whether Thrasybulus’ 
claims regarding divine intervention are true. The most Xenophon authorizes us to say with 
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certainty respecting Thrasybulus’ affairs is that, given his astonishing political and military 
successes in the wake of the Thirty’s rise to power, it makes sense that Thrasybulus 
conceived of his aims on behalf of the exiles as deserving to succeed, and therefore, as 
having the support of gods who care about the flourishing of the just and punishment of 
the wicked. Accordingly, as if to vindicate Thrasybulus’ moral confidence, Xenophon 
chooses to end Book Two with what a democratic reader might readily interpret as an 
endorsement, on the part of Xenophon himself, of democratic government. For he testifies 
both to the durability and to the justice of the restored Athenian democracy in Books Two’s 
final clause: “And now (nun) they live as citizens (politeuontai), and the demos abides by 
its oaths” (2.4.43).67    
With a victorious Thrasybulus having delivered the final speech, and with 
Xenophon assuring us of the (long) endurance of the restored Athenian democracy,68 our 
expectations as regards that man and his ambitions are thus heightened as Xenophon brings 
his account of Athenian affairs to a close. Will Thrasybulus—enterprising, popular, and 
deferential to Athenian piety on a way Alcibiades was not—achieve a synthesis of the 
political talents that always evaded Alcibiades, namely a synthesis of imperial ambition 
and democratic statesmanship? Might Thrasybulus be able to replace Alcibiades as Athens’ 
hope for a renewed empire? 
                                                 
67 This final sentence is all the more striking, since, in the Greek, the final word is literally demos. 
68 Scholars speculate that Xenophon wrote these passages long after his return to Greece from Asia, possibly 
during the 350’s BCE. 
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6. ATHENS’ ENTRANCE INTO THE CORINTHIAN WAR  
 
Unsurprisingly, the restoration of the democracy at Athens has profound and lasting 
consequences for Greek affairs, generally. If Sparta’s intention of maintaining Athens as a 
puppet government had succeeded, Spartan domination of Greece might have been much 
more readily fulfilled. In Thrasybulus’ view, by contrast, the restoration of the 
democracy—and, perforce, the overthrow of the Spartan junta—were facilitated by gods 
who favored the justice of the Athenian demos. Thrasybulus attempts to internalize the 
hopes of the Athenian demos, and then to articulating them in a coherent vision of Athens’ 
place in the cosmic whole.  
Accordingly, it is a part of that vision that Athens’ return to the stage of Greek 
Affairs as an active participant is sanctioned by the gods. Thus, in the years separating 
Thrasybulus’ dominant role in the restoration of the democracy in 403 BCE from his 
sudden reappearance as an Athenian imperialist in 390-389 BCE—years that witness such 
events as the Spartan invasion of Persia, the Corinthian War, and Peisander’s defeat at 
Cnidus—Xenophon makes clear that Thrasybulus shaped Athenian policy in a way that 
proved decisive for the course of Greek affairs, as a whole. For it was Thrasybulus who 
administered Athens’ entrance into the “Corinthian War,” the most substantial war in 
Greece since the Peloponnesian.  
Athens’ entrance into this war was occasioned in the following way. After it 
became clear to the Persians that Agesilaus and his Spartans posed a grave threat to the 
Persian empire as a whole, Tithraustes—satrap of Artaxerxes and replacement of 
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Tissaphernes—bribed Thebes and other leading Greek cities to provoke a war with Sparta 
(3.5.1). Though Xenophon never uses the appellation, this provocation escalated into what 
later historians have dubbed the Corinthian War69—a massive “Greek Affair” if there ever 
was one, which pitted Sparta and its allies against a coalition including Athens, Thebes, 
Argos, Corinth, and their respective allies and colonies.70 In a manner reminiscent of 
Thucydides’ depiction of the first Sparta Conference and the Melian Dialogue, Xenophon 
begins his account of the Corinthian War with an up-close look at Thebes’ attempt to 
persuade Athens to join its anti-Spartan alliance. And it is at this conference that 
Thrasybulus makes a most revealing appearance.  
As regards Greek affairs as a whole, much depends on Thebes’ ability to convince 
Athens that joining this alliance against Sparta is worthwhile. Thebes has already taken its 
bribe from the Persians; if it fails to persuade Athens, the only other significant military 
power in Greece besides Sparta and Thebes, it would necessary have two face two 
unpalatable options: (1) take on Sparta, the dominant hegemon of Greece, without Athens’ 
assistance; or (2) explain to Persia why Thebes, despite having taken the bribe money, is 
refusing to uphold its end of the bargain. It is in the middle of this high-stakes game that 
the Theban ambassadors craft an argument to the Athenians calculated to stir that city’s 
dominant passions. On the one hand, the Thebans appeal to the Athenian non-democrats in 
the audience, arguing that they, especially, should seek retribution against the Spartans, for 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., P. J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006) 185, 192, 
209-211, 227; John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, Oswyn Murray, The Oxford History of Greece and the 
Hellenistic World (New York: Oxford, 2001) 488. 
70 Xenophon accordingly devotes all of Book Four (and then some: 3.5.1-5.1.31) to chronicling this war.  
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having “handed you over to the rabble” (plethei 3.5.9). This is, of course, a sensible enough 
statement to make in the presence of Athenian oligarchs, many of whom doubtless resent 
the fact that Pausanias prevented Lysander from reestablishing an oligarchy after the fall 
of the Thirty. Yet it is also a shocking statement to make in the presence of the Athenian 
democrats, whom it characterizes as a bloodthirsty horde not to be trusted with the sound 
administration of justice. Thus, perhaps sensing their indiscretion, the Thebans deftly pivot: 
“Consequently, those men [the Spartans] would have let you perish; but the demos, here, 
saved you” (3.5.9). With this turn, the Thebans shift the blame away from the punitive 
“rabble,” to “those men”: the selfish, unjust Spartans, who simply abandoned their allies. 
They thereby emphasize the justice and magnanimity with which the Athenian demos 
restrained its retributive sensibilities, and “saved” the Athenian oligarchs. 
Having evoked the Athenian Civil War and the unity that its conclusion brought 
about, the Thebans now introduce and develop their main concern: “Now, men of Athens, 
that you wish to establish the empire you used to have, everyone knows (epistametha). And 
how could this come about more reasonably (eikos) than if you assisted those who were 
done injustice to by those men [the Spartans]?” (3.5.10). The Thebans then repeat this 
argument in the course of their brief speech, tempting the Athenians to pursue the very 
grandest of imperial enterprises, namely the conquest of Persia:  
“How is it not likely, if you should lead those that were manifestly done injustice 
[by the Spartans], that you would now become the greatest of [the cities] by far 
(popote). For, when you used to have an empire, you ruled only the [cities] by the 
sea; but now, you might become the rulers of all--of us, of the Peloponnesians, of 
those you previously ruled, and of the King [of Persia] himself, who holds the 
greatest power” (3.5.14).  
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Xenophon here observes that the Thebans’ speech was favorably received by the 
Athenians, “many” of whom “spoke in [the Thebans’] support” (3.5.16). Afterward, 
“everyone voted to aid [Thebes]” (3.5.16).  
The Athenians’ enthusiastic reaction here indicates that the current democratic 
regime at Athens by no means takes umbrage at it being attributed to them that they wish 
to reestablish empire in Greece. And Xenophon, accordingly, places none other than 
Thrasybulus at the very center of Athens’ decision to aid Thebes (3.5.16). Is was 
Thrasybulus who “announced the vote” to the Thebans (3.5.16). In so doing, Thrasybulus 
confirms his own active role in the deliberations, as well as his own favorable disposition 
toward the proposal. To this end, Xenophon includes here two statements of Thrasybulus. 
(These, we should note, are the only remarks we heard directly from an Athenian during 
this decisive conference.) Thrasybulus announces to the Thebans that, even though Athens 
remains un-walled,71 the Athenians will nevertheless run the risk of paying back the 
Thebans for having refrained from joining Lysander in his invasion of Athens. “‘For 
whereas you,’ he said, ‘did not join in making war against us, we, at least, will fight with 
you against those men, should they go against you’” (3.5.16-17 my italics). Here we find 
Thrasybulus’ characteristic moral-seriousness on display. Just as, during the Athenian Civil 
War, Thrasybulus framed his rebellion against the oligarchs in terms of justice—and later, 
justified the rule of the demos in Athens on the grounds of their moral superiority—here 
we find him promising to wage a war against Sparta on the grounds that that city has 
                                                 
71 Lysander tore down the walls during his invasion in 404 BCE (2.2.23). 
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“moved against” an ally: Thebes.  
However, despite Thrasybulus’ professed commitment to aiding Thebes justly 
“should Sparta move against them,” Xenophon complicates this picture by making it clear 
that it was in fact Thebes, having been bribed by the Persians, who originally instigated the 
Corinthian War. For “Thebes knew that unless someone found a means to begin a war, the 
Spartans would not break their treaties” (3.5.3). Thrasybulus in his moral commitment to 
aiding the Thebans conveniently ignores this fact, no doubt because of his eagerness to 
reinitiate Athens’ imperial enterprise—a goal Xenophon shortly thereafter shows 
Thrasybulus to have succeeded in. 
7. THE CAMPAIGN IN HELLESPONT 
 
Athens’ entrance into the Corinthian War, instigated by Thrasybulus, thus provides 
the Athenians with an opportunity to reconquer their former colonies in the Hellespont. 
And it is none other than Thrasybulus whom the Athenians assign to execute this enterprise. 
Xenophon frames Thrasybulus’ Hellespont campaign with an explanation of the political 
events at the island of Rhodos, a democratically governed colony of Athens that had (as a 
result of the Corinthian War) recently been invaded by the Spartans under the impressive 
Spartan general, Teleutias (4.8.23-24). Sparta’s decision to send Teleutias to Rhodos, for 
the purpose of replacing its democratic government with a Sparta-friendly oligarchy, was 
precipitated by an Athenian-instigated democratic revolution at Rhodos, as a result of 
which the exiled Rhodian oligarchs made the following plea to Sparta: “It was unworthy 
of them [the Spartans] to allow the Athenians to conquer Rhodos, and in so doing, assemble 
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(sunthemenous) such power” (4.8.20). Here the Rhodian oligarchs discern what the 
Spartans do not. Athens’ machinations in the Hellespont region is only part of a broader 
attempt to reassemble their previous colonies, and to actualize the imperial ambitions 
which the Thebans encouraged them to pursue at the end of Book Three. Such 
machinations have been possible for Athens during the Corinthian War (at this point, 
entering its fifth-year) because Sparta has been too distracted by war with the anti-Spartan 
coalition to notice events outside of the Peloponnesus and Attica. Thus, it is only after the 
Athenians manage to stage a successful coup at Rhodos that the Spartans decide to send a 
fleet to the island, so as to reinstate the Rhodian oligarchs.72 
It is in response to reports about Rhodos, and to Sparta’s return to naval power, 
generally, that Athens dispatches Thrasybulus across the Aegean. Thrasybulus, however, 
“made no attempt to help Rhodos,” thinking that the Rhodian democrats were strong 
enough to preserve themselves against the Spartans.73 Thrasybulus clearly recognizes that 
his considerable talents and supplies would be better spent reconquering the Hellespont 
area than consolidating Athens’ already-secure possessions. He thus initiates a four-part 
campaign, taking him all the way from the Pontus (the modern-day Black Sea), around the 
coast of Asia Minor, to Aspendos (at the base of modern-day Turkey).  
                                                 
72 It is also worth mentioning that Sparta’s navy at this stage of the Hellenica had been vastly diminished as 
a result of Peisander’s massive defeat at Cnidus by the Persians and Athenians. The Spartans therefore had 
to start from scratch before sending a fleet to send to Rhodos—which the Athenians, seeking to establish 
naval hegemony in Greece, quickly catch wind of. Hence, Xenophon begins his account of Thrasybulus’ 
campaigns by noting that “the Athenians believed that the Lacedaemonians were again organizing power in 
the sea” (4.8.25). 
73 His expectations in this regard were correct: We learn at the beginning of Book Five that Teleutias, the 
Spartan general assigned to recapture Rhodos, is, a year later [late 389 BCE], still trying to capture the island 
[5.1.4-5]. 
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In Xenophon’s words, Thrasybulus sets out to Hellespont “believing that he might 
bring about (katapraxai) something good (agathon) for his city” (4.8.26). No doubt, 
Thrasybulus is buoyed by the same sense of moral (and perhaps divine) purpose which 
propelled him to success in the Athenian Civil War. However, as Xenophon makes clear, 
Thrasybulus’ plans are nebulous. It is only once he arrives at Hellespont that he decides 
precisely how to begin work, learning shortly thereafter about a conflict between two 
regional powers: Amedokus, King of the Odrysians, and Seuthes, King of Thrace (4.8.26). 
These Thrasybulus decides to reconcile with one another, so as to make them “friends and 
allies” of Athens.  
Thrasybulus thus exhibits an approach similar to Alcibiades’ at the beginning of 
Book One. There, Xenophon gives no precise indication as to Alcibiades’ grand strategy; 
instead, he lets it be inferred that Alcibiades seeks to re-establish for Athens a means for 
systematically collecting funds by means of colonies. Alcibiades’ procedure flowed largely 
from prudential discretion: He picked individual goals and accomplishing them one-by-
one—all, however with a view to a single, overarching aim. Thrasybulus, similarly, holds 
no fixed plan for restoring Athens’ imperial presence in Asia, instead merely sensing that 
there are better ways that this might be done than through fighting the Spartans at Rhodos. 
Accordingly, by reconciling the Thracians and making them allies of Athens, Thrasybulus 
believed that the Greek cities on the coast of Thrace would be more likely to side with the 
Athenians if these rulers were friends (4.8.27). Xenophon, for his part, confirms this to be 
true: “These things, and the cities in Asia, came out nobly (exontōn kalōs) for the 
Athenians” (4.8.27).  
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With the situation on the Hellespont now favorable for Athens, Thrasybulus turns 
to making good on his goal to benefit the Athenians. No doubt bolstered by his successes 
in Thrace, Thrasybulus proceeds next to Byzantium. (Like Rhodos, Byzantium is a former 
Athenian colony, whose pre-Athenian democratic regime had been replaced by an 
oligarchy.) Again, Xenophon provides us with no information as to whether this second 
leg of Thrasybulus’ campaign was part of a pre-orchestrated plan, or, alternatively, whether 
Byzantium simply came to sight for Thrasybulus as the best place to continue expanding 
the empire. What we do learn is that Thrasybulus, like Alcibiades before him (1.3.8-12), 
seizes Byzantium with a view to imposing a ten-percent tax on all vessels moving back-
and-forth from Pontus (the Black Sea) into the Aegean. Possessing Byzantium constitutes 
a stable supply of funds for the Athenian military, which, in turn, is necessary for the re-
establishment of the empire. Thrasybulus, accordingly, succeeds in possessing Byzantium 
by replacing its anti-Athenian oligarchy with a pro-Athenian democracy (4.8.27), thereby 
ensuring a stable supply of tax revenue to Athens from the colony. Xenophon even adds, 
as if to remind us of Thrasybulus’ success as a democratic statesman, that the demos at 
Byzantium was “not displeased (ouk axtheinōs) by the presence of many Athenians in the 
city” (4.8.27). Thrasybulus secures the stability of Byzantium as an Athenian colony, then, 
by ensuring that the regime in that city is favorably disposed toward the Athenian, 
democratic way of life. 
Having added Byzantium, “as well as Chalcedon” (4.8.28), to the resurgent 
Athenian empire, Thrasybulus has managed to secure the entire region of northern Asia-
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Minor for Athens, this region consisting of the Hellespont,74 together with the strait that 
links Pontus and the Aegean (on each side of which stand Byzantium and Chalcedon). As 
we recall from Chapter Two, this was precisely the region which the Athenians and 
Spartans disputed at the beginning of the Hellenica, and in which the Spartans decisively 
triumphed over the Athenians at Aegospotami. Thrasybulus’ rapid conquest of such an 
historically disputed region—where the fate of their last empire was decided—perhaps 
portended to the Athenians a return to their former glory. 
Next, from northern Asia Minor, Thrasybulus sets out for the island of Lesbos, 
location of the former Athenian colony, Mytilene (Thucydides’ “Mytilenean Debate,” of 
fame75). As Xenophon now relates, the situation at Lesbos, formerly under Athens’ sway, 
is now disadvantageous for the Athenians. Mytilene is the only city in the region that does 
not actively support the Spartans; accordingly, as a result of Sparta’s conquest of the 
region, each city’s formerly Athenian government has been replaced by pro-Spartan 
oligarchies, or “decarchies.” In a situation which reminds us of Thrasybulus’ role in the 
Athenian Civil War, democratic exiles from the surrounding cities of Lesbos have flooded 
into Mytilene, evidently unwilling or unequipped or recapture their respective cities.  
Thrasybulus’ strategy here ingeniously combines democratic statesmanship and 
imperial vision. Having arrived at Mytilene, Thrasybulus delays attacking the Spartan-
allied cities, choosing instead to hold a conference involving the three main parties that are 
to take part in the re-conquest of Lesbos: (1) His own Athenian soldiers, (2) the democratic 
                                                 
74 The Hellespont itself consists of Abydos and the Chersonese. 
75 Thucydides 3.36-49. 
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exiles who had fled to Mytilene, and (3) “the most vigorous” (errōmenestatous) of the 
Mytilenians themselves (4.8.28). While an ordinary military commander might have 
eschewed enlisting the support of these local powers, preferring instead to rely solely on 
his own troops,76 Thrasybulus makes separate promises to each of the most significant 
military and political groups at Lesbos, promises calculated to gratify each of their 
characteristic interests. To the “most vigorous” of Mytilene, he promises that they will 
become the “leaders” (hupotheis) of all of Lesbos; to the exiles, that they would be able to 
return to their cities; and, to his own hoplites, that by bringing over Lesbos to the side of 
Athens, they will augment the empire’s revenues (4.8.28). Thrasybulus’ strategy pays off: 
“Having encouraged them and arranged them, he led them against Methymna”—the 
second largest city of Lesbos, after Mytilene.  
Present at Methymna is a Spartan force, headed by Therimachus, whose mission is 
to bolster the pro-Spartan oligarchies.77 Of the battle between Thrasybulus and 
Therimachus that ensued, Xenophon tells us only that Therimachus himself was killed, and 
his forces, crushed (4.8.29). In the course of a single battle, Sparta’s hegemony in Lesbos 
thus swiftly comes to an end. In under two years (390-389 BCE), then, Thrasybulus has 
single handedly restored the empire that Athens once held along the Asian coast—an 
accomplishment which, in the years to come, Sparta will exert itself to reverse (see, 
especially, 4.8.31). Accordingly, Sparta’s subsequent attempts to recapture the Asian coast 
                                                 
76 One thinks especially of the Spartan general Thibron, who, in his campaign in Asia, refused all political 
and diplomatic negotiations with the local powers—powers which, having long chafed under the despotism 
of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, would gladly have allied themselves with Thibron (3.1). 
77 These replaced the pro-Athenian democracies. 
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provoked the Athenians, “fearing lest their [affairs] in the Hellespont, which Thrasybulus 
arranged, would be lost,” to mount a grand defense of their Asian holdings (4.8.31 my 
italics). Thrasybulus’ Hellespont campaign thus impinges on Sparta’s capacity to project 
hegemonic power. What is more, Thrasybulus’ string of victories no doubt promises a 
fulfillment of Athens’ imperial hopes. To this end, given what Xenophon showed us of 
Thrasybulus’ performance in the Athenian Civil War, it is likely that Thrasybulus 
encouraged his soldiers to believe that their incredible success in Asia was the result of the 
justice of their cause. Thrasybulus himself, we recall, envisions his campaign as “bringing 
about some good”—not just for himself and his soldiers, but for Athens. 
8. THE DEATH OF THRASYBULUS AND THE FRAGILITY OF EMPIRE 
  
Thrasybulus’ unexpected death at Aspendos takes on significance in proportion 
with which his remarkable performances in the Athenian Civil War and in the Hellespont 
have, in Xenophon’s presentation, heightened our expectations as regards his future 
success and the success of Athens’ empire.  With the Spartans at Lesbos crushed, and the 
remainder of the Asian coast largely secure for Athens, Thrasybulus chooses now to sail 
for Rhodos, his original destination.78 But before doing so, he decides fatefully to make his 
army “as vigorous as possible” (hōs errōmenestaton) by first collecting funds at far-off 
Aspendos (4.8.30)—a decision which strikes us as strange, considering Thrasybulus 
originally eschewed his mission to Rhodos on the very grounds that it was strong enough 
                                                 
78 See section seven, above. 
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to hold off the Spartans on its own. Why does Thrasybulus now regard it as necessary to 
strengthen his forces? Moreover, as Strassler notes, it is odd that Thrasybulus elects to sail 
all the way from Mytilene to Aspendos, what with Rhodos lying roughly halfway between 
the two cities.79 Perhaps his battle with Therimachus having left the Athenians depleted, 
Thrasybulus feels it necessary to prepare himself for all possible contingencies, so as not 
to be taken off his guard by the Spartans. This seems likely, given that Thrasybulus goes 
to Aspendos, located in southern Asia-Minor, only after having first “raised money from 
other cities,” as well (4.8.30). Evidently, the money he obtained from cities in the vicinity 
of Lesbos was, in his view, insufficient.  
Having arrived at Aspendos and anchored on the Eurymedon River, on which the 
city is situated, Thrasybulus succeeds in extracting funds (4.8.30). His voyage would thus 
seem to be complete. Yet Xenophon here notes that he and his soldiers spend (at least) one 
night on land, having made a camp somewhere near Aspendos. Perhaps Thrasybulus 
decided to remain for the night because it was simply too late to set sail for Rhodos once 
he had finished negotiating with the city’s officials. Nothing in what we have seen so far 
looks at all out of the ordinary, then, particularly for a man as daring and improvisational 
as Thrasybulus. Yet Xenophon notes rather perplexingly that some of Thrasybulus’ men 
“did injustice to the fields” at Aspendos. This, in turn, so enrages the Aspendians that they 
attack the Athenian camp at night, cutting Thrasybulus down in his bed. Xenophon for his 
part leaves the timeline of these events rather hazy. Yet we can infer that the Aspendians 
                                                 
79 Landmark, 170 n4.8.30b. 
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discovered their wrecked fields sometime after giving Thrasybulus his funds, since, 
presumably, they would have withheld their funds had the Athenians so enraged them 
beforehand.   
Xenophon comments on Thrasybulus’ death with the following laconic summary: 
“So, even (kai) Thrasybulus--indeed, very much (dē mala) believed to be a good man (anēr 
agathos)--met his end in this way” (4.8.31). Xenophon’s formulation here includes two 
details which might strike us at first as superfluous; he contrasts Thrasybulus’ “seeming 
goodness” with the wanton, meaningless way in which Thrasybulus meets his end. In so 
doing, Xenophon forces us to grapple with the fact that “even” a “seemingly good man” 
like Thrasybulus can come to ruin--not on the battlefield, fighting alongside the gods whom 
he deemed his allies--but in his bed, at night, in a foreign city.  
Xenophon’s account of the rise and fall of Thrasybulus thus adds a new layer to his 
treatment of empire in the Hellenica, exposing the unique, impressive qualities possessed 
by men like Thrasybulus. Yet it also brings to light the fragility of empire—and the 
instability of human affairs, generally—by concentrating on Thrasybulus’ meaningless 
death, and the effect of his death on Athens’ pursuit of empire. The successes which 
Thrasybulus achieves during the Athenian Civil War suggest that he possesses both the 
power and shrewdness to succeed where Alcibiades failed. What is more, as he himself 
alleges, his victories at Athens are perhaps the result of divine aid; in this respect, he 
appears to remedy what the impious Alcibiades got wrong. Both of these hypotheses are 
undercut, however, by Thrasybulus’ dismal, unanticipated failure at Aspendos—in 
describing which Xenophon reaffirms what he showed through his account of Alcibiades, 
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namely the unsettling degree to which imperial success, and rule, in general, depend on 
factors—whether chance, or providential gods, we do not know—whose ways elude our 
understanding. 
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IV. Jason of Pherai 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise and fall of Jason, tyrant of northern-Greek city of Pherai, constitutes the 
final iteration of Xenophon’s treatment of failed empire the Hellenica. In two self-styled 
“digressions,”80 Xenophon apprises us of Jason’s ambition to conquer Greece (6.1, 
6.4.25)—and then the world (6.1.12). For contemporary readers, Jason thus comes to sight 
as a kind of Alexander the Great who never was.81 To this end, Xenophon suggests that if 
any Greek man in the Hellenica is in a position to achieve empire on a massive scale—
and, in so doing, to succeed where Alcibiades and Thrasybulus failed—it is Jason, “the 
greatest man of his [time]” (6.4.28). What, then, in Xenophon’s view, makes this failed 
empire-seeker so great? Xenophon helps us answer this question by showing Jason to be 
particularly aware of the radically contingent character of political affairs; shortly before 
his own unexpected downfall, Jason proclaims that “the god, it seems, takes joy (xairei) in 
frequently making the great small, and the small, great” (6.4.24). Jason, perhaps the 
Hellenica’s most promising empire-seeker, turns out also to be its most skeptical as regards 
man’s capacity to guarantee political success through the pursuit of empire. And it is this, 
I argue, in which his greatness largely consists. Jason is aware, albeit to a limited degree, 
of the fundamental character of political life as Xenophon depicts it in the Hellenica: He 
                                                 
80 See Strauss, “Greek Historians,” 662. Strauss, sticking closer to Xenophon’s Greek, calls these digressions 
“excursions”; the verb Xenophon uses is ekbainō, which means, literally, “to walk out of,” or, “to walk away 
from.” See also Proietti, Xenophon’s Sparta, xiv.  
81 Buzzetti, Xenophon the Socratic Prince (New York: Palgrave, 2014) 90-91. See also Arrian, Anabasis of 
Alexander, 2.7.8-9. 
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discerns the fragility of human knowledge and human power in the face of “the god,” while 
attempting to achieve global empire, nevertheless.  
2. TYRANTS AND GENTLEMEN: XENOPHON’S DRAMATIC INTRODUCTION OF JASON 
   
Xenophon opens Book Six with a very brief summary of Greek affairs. Thebes, 
having reunited Boeotia, chooses to invade their former colony of Phocis, which, in turn, 
appeals to Sparta for aid. With Sparta thus scrambling to uphold the freedom of this 
previously-free Greek city, Xenophon announces the arrival of one Polydamas of 
Pharsalus, a magistrate and “gentleman” (kalos te kagathos 6.1.1), at Sparta. Reputed to be 
a reliable advocate (proxenos) on behalf of Sparta in Pharsalus, Polydamas reports to the 
Spartan Assembly a moral-political dilemma in which he currently finds himself.  
Recently, Polydamas was appraoched by Jason, the well-known tyrant of Pherai. 
Having laid out the immense military and political resources at his disposal, as well as his 
intentions to subdue all of Greece, and then Persia, Jason presented Polydamas with two 
alternatives: Either bring the city of Pharsalus over to Jason’s side, or request aid from the 
Spartans to defend Pharsalus and the freedom of the other cities which he, Jason, intends 
shortly to conquer. Polydamas, having chosen (for the time being) the latter alternative, 
thus appears at Sparta, pleading for a military defense against Jason.  
Now, strategically, Jason’s diplomatic maneuver here is rather perplexing. For 
while the opening of his speech to Polydamas strikes a threatening, almost bullying note 
(see 6.1.5, and, especially, 6.1.7), Jason quickly makes it clear that he wishes to enlist 
Polydamas as an ally—so eager, in fact, that he promises to make Polydamas his second-
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in-command, even if Polydamas wishes first to appeal to the Spartans for help! In other 
words, Jason does not simply demand of Polydamas that he join as an accomplice in his 
campaign. Instead, Jason actually gives Polydamas the option of first appealing to the 
Spartans, and then, should the Spartans refuse assistance, retroactively joining Jason’s 
imperial enterprise. And, as it turns out, the Spartans do refuse assistance; and Polydamas, 
accordingly, brings over Pharsalus to Jason’s side and becomes Jason’s lieutenant.  
What, then, does Xenophon intend for us to learn about empire-seeking from the 
fact that Jason, unlike Alcibiades or Thrasybulus, manages to secure his most important 
goals—acquiring Pharsalus, enlisting Polydamas, and becoming hegemon over all of 
Thessaly—by shrewd diplomatic maneuvering, as opposed to force? Let us begin by 
considering the seemingly generous deal with which Jason approaches Polydamas. Had the 
Spartans heeded Polydamas instead of the Phocians, Jason would have been compelled to 
fight a united force consisting of Sparta, its allies, and Pharsalus under Polydamas. One 
obvious possibility Xenophon holds out is that Jason knew Spartan behavior so well, and 
that he read Greece’s current political landscape (in particular, Sparta’s involvement in 
Phocis) so shrewdly and attentively, that he was able, by means of raw political calculation, 
to anticipate Sparta’s refusal to aid Pharsalus.  
However, even if Jason did manage to predict Sparta’s refusal—and the 
unpredictability of Greek affairs as Xenophon has depicted them so far causes us to doubt 
this possibility—his permitting Polydamas to seek Spartan aid was still a gamble. That 
Jason was willing to take such a gamble in the first place thus forces us to ask why Jason 
would set such a high price on Polydamas’ cooperation. To this end, we do well to consider 
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the seemingly extraneous features of Xenophon’s description of Polydamas. Xenophon 
begins his introduction of Polydamas by noting that “in the other cities of Thessaly he was 
so well-reputed (mala ēudokimei), and in his own city he was of such repute (houtōs edokei) 
as a gentleman, that (hōste) when the Pharsalians were in civil war,” they entrusted 
Polydamas with administering the entire public treasury, which included collecting taxes, 
paying for “divine things,” and seeing that the laws were enforced (6.1.2). In effect, 
Polydamas was regarded as so trustworthy by his fellow citizens, that two factions within 
his city which were actually willing to kill each other in civil war were nevertheless willing 
to invest him with the city’s responsibilities. Needless to say, Polydamas’ accomplishment 
was a remarkable one. To have been designated by both sides of a raging civil war as above 
reproach and worthy of temporary rule, Polydamas must have transcended factionalism 
and attained statesmanlike public-spiritedness in a surpassingly rare way. Significantly, 
Xenophon’s construction in Greek82 implies that Polydamas’ trustworthiness during the 
Pharsalian Civil War resulted directly from his being a gentleman; it is as if to say, 
Polydamas revealed himself as a perfect gentleman by performing the deeds that he did.  
It is perhaps for this reason that Xenophon chooses to introduce Polydamas, the 
only example of a gentleman in the Hellenica,83 in context of the imperial rise of Jason. 
For Polydamas makes his debut as the gentleman of the Hellenica as a man faced with a 
moral-political decision perhaps more difficult than any single decision he would have 
                                                 
82 By using an actual result clause, Xenophon implies that Polydamas’ being a gentleman is what caused him 
to act in such a statesmanlike way during the civil war. 
83 The formula kalos kagathos is used in only one other place in the Hellenica, in Xenophon’s account of the 
Thirty Oligarchs: 2.3-4. 
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faced during the Pharsalian Civil War. To provoke us into wondering what a gentleman is, 
Xenophon thus depicts a man reputed to be a gentleman making a decision that will shed 
light on why he is reputed to be a gentleman.  
In response to Jason’s proposal, Polydamas first insists upon consulting with his 
close allies, the Spartans: “For people who were friends of the Lacedaemonians to secede 
and go over to their enemies without having any charge to bring against them—this, I said 
[to Jason], seemed to me to be impossible” (aporon 6.1.13). A more ambitious, self-seeking 
political man might have seized at the opportunity to become the lieutenant of Jason, “the 
greatest man of his time” (6.4.28), who is evidently well-positioned to conquer all of 
Greece. Nevertheless, when the Spartans refuse help, Polydamas does choose to ally his 
city and himself with Jason. To do otherwise would, presumably, have spelled certain 
doom for Pharsalus, the city Polydamas strove so hard to serve during its civil war. 
Accordingly, when Polydamas insisted on speaking to the Spartans, “[Jason] thereupon 
praised me [Polydamas] and said that he would hold (ekteon) me all the more (mallon) 
because I was that sort of a man” (hoti toioutos eiēn 6.1.13)—namely, a gentleman. 
Xenophon’s emphasis on the theme of gentlemanliness at this particular moment of the 
Hellenica thus prompts us to wonder why Jason, the tyrant, values Polydamas as a 
gentleman so highly.  
 Another part of what makes Jason so intriguing is Xenophon's superlative 
characterization of him as “the greatest man of his own time.” But what exactly does 
Xenophon think warrants this characterization, and how does it logically relate to his 
depiction of Jason’s concern with Polydamas the gentleman? The way I propose answering 
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this question is to examine the unusual synthesis of (Greek) political modes which Jason 
seeks to achieve, a synthesis of tyrant, empire, and gentleman. Jason’s eagerness to 
incorporate a gentleman such as Polydamas into his imperial project would seem to 
contradict two basic principles of classical political theory: (1) the traditional enmity 
between tyrants and aristocrats or gentleman, and (2) the non-imperial character tyrannies, 
owing to the permanent insecurity of tyrants with respect to their rule over domestic affairs. 
Xenophon’s concentration on this dimension of Jason’s imperial project deepens the 
overall treatment of empire—its advantages as well as its disadvantages—in the Hellenica. 
 As we observed in Chapter Two, above, the tyrant Critias saw fit shortly after 
assuming power at Athens to kill, systematically, Athens’ most public spirited men; and 
Xenophon notes that he did this because he knew such men would not so easily let 
themselves be pushed out of the city’s affairs. Critias consequently saw fit to clear Athens’ 
political ground of spirited men, so as to make room for himself and the Thirty. Jason, for 
his part, alludes to this tyrannical strategy in his proposition to Polydamas, arguing that he 
would much prefer to win him over (prosagaesthai) willingly than unwillingly:  
If I were to win you by force, you would conspire against me whatever evil (kakon) 
might be in you power; and I would wish to make you as weak as possible. If, on 
the other hand, I were to persuade you to join me, then it is manifest that we would 
have the power to augment each other. (6.1.7 my italics)  
 
Jason, proceeding next to promise to make Polydamas “the greatest of [men] in Greece” 
after himself (6.1.8), thus holds out the possibility that he and the gentleman, Polydamas, 
might very well serve each other’s interests by making each other better. The possibility is 
a tempting one for Jason no doubt in part because the alternatives are so unattractive. 
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Killing or exiling Polydamas would cause Jason to lose favor not only with Polydamas’ 
countrymen, the Pharsalians, but also with many of the Thessalians (cf. 6.1.5 with 6.1.2), 
whom he, Jason, seeks to unite, train, and rule over as tagos or chieftain (6.1.8-9), before 
leading them against all of Greece (6.1.9). What is more, seizing Pharsalus without 
Polydamas’ cooperation, and then leaving Polydamas in power, would (as Jason himself 
points out) pose a grave problem to his own tyrannical rule, just as Athens’ spirited 
gentlemen posed a threat to Critias and the Thirty. For as a gentleman who cares for justice 
in his city, Polydamas would probably reject Jason’s tyrannical rule over Pharsalus, and 
consequently, work to undermine it. Yet Xenophon also makes it clear that Jason has more 
than enough military and political power to overcome these obstacles; Polydamas himself 
says so (6.1.6).  
This fact, together with Jason’s emphatic, seemingly earnest proposal to 
Polydamas, suggest that Jason sees in securing Polydamas’ cooperation, not just the easiest 
of three alternatives, but rather, a potential positive benefit to his imperial project. Should 
Jason persuade Polydamas willingly to join his imperial project, it is hard to imagine a 
more useful counselor of state. Not only has Polydamas proved himself manifestly 
competent in managing political affairs by serving as magistrate during the Pharsalian Civil 
War; he has also proved himself a surpassingly trustworthy ally. For, in addition to 
maintaining the trust of the warring factions of Pharsalus, Polydamas did his best (as 
Xenophon make clear by giving him the first speech of Book Six) to persuade his allies, 
the Spartans, that Jason poses a massive threat, not only to them, but to all of Greece. In 
effect, we might say, Polydamas’ initial reluctance to join Jason’s campaign, on account of 
 75 
his agreement with the Spartans, only serves to confirm his value as a potential ally of 
Jason.  
This sword cuts both ways, however. Polydamas’ seriousness as a gentleman could 
pose a problem for the aspiring tyrant, Jason, whose rise to power in Greece would surely 
call for promise-breaking, machinations, and all manner of dirty tricks. Should the 
gentleman Polydamas be unwilling to authorize or support such dirty tricks, one wonders 
how Jason might react. Xenophon himself provides a possible answer in his depiction of 
Theramenes (counselor) and Critias (tyrant). Should Polydamas oppose Jason’s 
bloodthirsty machinations, would we witness at Jason’s court a replay of Critias’ execution 
of the (relatively) principled Theramenes? 
3. JASON THE IMPERIAL TYRANT 
 
Another important aspect of Jason’s character as an empire-seeker is his recognition 
of the indispensability of discipline, continence, restraint, and hard work for the acquisition 
of empire. In his speech to the Spartans, Polydamas declares that war with Jason would pit 
Sparta against “powerful forces and a man who is so prudent as a general that whatever he 
sets out to obtain, whether by stealth, by foresight, or by force, he does not fail to obtain.” 
The cause of Jason’s success, elaborates Polydamas, is the effect that his rule has on the 
men under him:  
He has made his men just like himself. At the same time, he knows how to make 
his men obtain what they desire whenever they have done something really good 
through hard work, with the result that his men have learned that through their hard 
labor will come pleasures, as well. Moreover, of all the men I know, he is the one 
most able to control the desires of his body, so that he is not hindered by such things 
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in doing what must be done. (6.1.15-16) 
 
To this end, Jason himself announces that in his own army there exists not a single man 
who can match him in his capacity for “hard work” (ponein)—a boast Polydamas confirms 
by asserting that Jason is a “lover of hard work” (philoponos 6.1.5-6).84 But to what end, 
we wonder, does Jason direct his and his men’s hard work? Xenophon answers our question 
by spotlighting Jason’s desire to impose his own qualities of soul on the peoples and nations 
whom he conquers. Consider, for example, Jason’s remarks respecting the current status 
of the Thessalians: “Looking at their bodies and their greatness of soul (megalopsuxia), I 
think that if someone treated them nobly, the Thessalians would not think it worthy of 
themselves to be ruled (hupekooi) by any other people” (6.1.9). Jason envisions a change 
that must take place not just in the current political situation in Thessaly, namely his 
becoming tagos or chieftain. Additionally, and more deeply, he discerns in the Thessalians 
a latent though hitherto undeveloped potential to achieve the qualities of soul necessary to 
be a ruling, rather than ruled, people. These qualities, as he makes clear, coalesce around 
the self-respect a people has for itself. Evidently, the Thessalians in their current condition 
lack what it takes to hold themselves worthy of refusing to submit blindly to despotic rule. 
Jason, we might say, seeks to make the Thessalians capable of freedom. Or, to put it slightly 
differently, Jason seeks not merely to conquer other nations, but to transform them into 
men fit to undertake daring, serious, enterprising tasks—something Polydamas alluded to 
                                                 
84 For those familiar with Xenophon’s two most impressive characters, Socrates and Cyrus, it is hard to 
imagine Xenophon bestowing higher praise on a leader than his praise of Jason here. Both Cyrus and 
Socrates, notwithstanding their manifold differences, exhibit many of the qualities of soul possessed by 
Jason—continence, or disciplined self-control in the face of pleasures, in particular. 
 77 
in saying that Jason “makes his men just like himself.” 
In this respect, Jason differs most decisively from the Critias, the other prominent 
tyrant we encounter in the Hellenica. Whereas Jason seeks to form the passions of self-
respect and self-rule in the souls of the Thessalians, Critias undertakes (unsuccessfully) to 
transform a people that already holds itself to be free into a people willing to submit to 
despotic tyranny under the Thirty. Accordingly, Critias sought to stamp out Athens’ most 
spirited men (such as Thrasybulus), who, as such, were likely to resist the Thirty’s rule and 
to seek to restore the freedom of the demos.85 Jason, by contrast, seeks to appropriate to his 
own project the serious and public spirited gentleman, Polydamas, as well as to elevate the 
men he seeks to rule from the status of slaves to the status of free men. 
How does Jason’s desire to transform slavish men into ambitious ones fit in to his 
envisioned conquest of Greece and then the world? In a statement that reminds us of 
Alcibiades’ desire to appropriate the “infinite” wealth of Persia for his own, by extension, 
Athens’ use, Jason contends:  
You know, of course, that the King of Persia is the wealthiest of men because he 
receives tribute not from the islands but from the mainland. Despite that, I think we 
could make even the King of Persia subject to us more easily than we could Greece, 
for I know that all men there have trained for slavery rather than for bravery (alkēn), 
and I know how the King was driven to extremes by the forces both of those who 
went on the Anabasis of Cyrus (anabasēs hurou) and those who marched with 
Agesilaus. (6.1.12 my italics) 
 
The thrust of Jason’s remark here, if we take it together with his remarks concerning the 
possibility of raising the Thessaly from slaves to free men, is that he, Jason, has learned 
                                                 
85 Theramenes explicitly warns this in regards both to Alcibiades and to Thrasybulus; see Chapter Three, 
above. 
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the importance of Greek freedom and bravery from the example set—by none other than 
Xenophon! Reports of the havoc reaped by the Ten-Thousand in Persia—perhaps including 
Xenophon’s own book, the Anabasis—have confirmed in Jason’s mind the superiority of 
Greeks to Persians in respect to discipline, courage, and military virtue, in general. The 
lesson Jason derives from Xenophon’s Anabasis is that a Greek empire-seeker capable of 
modeling himself after Xenophon might subdue the entire Persian empire. Part of what 
makes Jason “the greatest man of his time” must be that Jason grasped what Xenophon 
himself saw in Greece’s relationship with Persia. To repeat Xenophon’s exhortation of the 
Greeks in the Anabasis, which we noted in Chapter Two, above: 
It seems to me to be equitable (eikos) and just that we first attempt to reach Greece 
and our comrades (tous oikeious) and point out (epideixai) to the Greeks that they 
voluntarily live in poverty (hekontes penontai), and that they could now bring here 
[Persia] those who are living as citizens with difficulty (sklērōs politeuontas) and 
see them being provided for richly. For, men, it is manifest that all these good things 
belong to those who are most capable. (3.2.26) 
 
As we recall from Chapter Two, Xenophon indicates through his juxtaposition of the 
Persians—possessing infinite monies—and Alcibiades—possessing no money—a glaring 
disparity between those with supplies who are unable to use them, and those without 
supplies who nevertheless could use them, if adequately supplied. And for a time, it seems 
as though Alcibiades might be the Greek most capable of remedying this disparity, to which 
Xenophon so explicitly draws our attention in the above-quoted passage of the Anabasis. 
Accordingly, in Book Six—a full thirty-one years after Alcibiades’ defeat at Notium—it is 
Jason whom Xenophon depicts as possessing the clearest grasp of the imperial possibilities 
that lie before Greece. 
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4. JASON’S SUDDEN DOWNFALL 
 
Despite his overwhelming prudence, justice, inherited political power, and good 
fortune, Jason, like Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, comes to a shocking, untimely, and 
ignominious end, at the hands of seven brigands who “later received honors in many of the 
Greek cities” (6.4.32). As a result, Xenophon indicates, the political chaos that unfolded in 
Pherai as a result of Jason’s death ensured that, at least in the foreseeable future, no ruler 
in Pherai would be able to pick up Jason’s torch where he dropped it, so as to continue the 
imperial project Jason began (6.4.33-37).  
Now, as we have seen so far, Xenophon builds up Jason’s anticipated imperial 
project in a way similar to that in which he drew us into the affairs of Alcibiades and 
Thrasybulus. Consequently, Jason’s sudden fall from power, like that of the former two, 
takes us by surprise, and fills us with considerable disappointment. Yet Xenophon here, 
too, introduces the question of whether the god(s) played a role in Jason’s downfall. Before 
beginning his brief account of Jason’s fall (6.4.31-32), Xenophon notes that Jason 
destroyed a certain wall at Herakleia which stood between Pherai and the rest of Greece. 
He did this, Xenophon states, “because he believed that by destroying Herakleia, which 
sits on a narrow piece of ground, he could not be prevented by anyone else from marching 
back into Greece whenever he wished to do so” (6.4.27). Why Jason might wish to march 
quickly into Greece sometime in the future, Xenophon has, of course, made clear enough 
in his description of Jason’s meeting with Polydamas.  
It is thus in the immediate wake of this allusion to Jason’s anticipated invasion of 
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Greece that Xenophon suddenly describes Jason’s death. In 370 BCE, we learn, Jason 
initiated preparations for the Pythian festival at Delphi by commanding “the cities” to 
contribute victims for the common sacrifices. In addition, Jason announces that a prize 
would be given to whoever donated the finest bull (6.4.29). Neither of these observations 
are particularly out of keeping with what we might expect from an ambitious Greek leader, 
eager to take his place at the Delphic Festival among the established Greek powers. What 
Xenophon notes next, however, introduces a complication. Jason also ordered the 
Thessalians (over all of whom he ruled, at this time) to be prepared for battle at the time of 
the Pythia, because  
as they say (hōs ephasan), he intended to establish himself as the leader in the god’s 
honor (panegurin tō theō) and of the contests. However, regarding the sacred 
monies (tōn hierōn chrematōn), whatever he intended is, even now, still unclear; 
but it is said that when the Delphians asked what they should do (poiein), if he 
should take the god’s monies (tōn toū theoū chrematōn), the god replied that he 
would take care of it by himself. (6.4.31)  
 
By twice qualifying this statement as a report (“as they say,” “it is said”), Xenophon causes 
us to suspect its veracity. More precisely, he causes us to question both why Jason prepared 
the Thessalians for battle, as well as whether Apollo in fact replied as they Delphians claim. 
Are the events that follow, we accordingly wonder, part of Apollo’s providence? Or, 
alternatively, does Xenophon regard the report that Apollo would “take care of things 
himself” as hearsay? 
Regardless, in the passage that follows, Xenophon briefly describes Jason’s 
unexpected slaying by three impetuous young men On this score, Xenophon further draws 
out our surprise, and perhaps our disappointment, by prefacing his account of Jason’s death 
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with these words:  
And so, the real man (ho anēr), so young (tēlikoūtos)86 and having contrived so 
many and so grand of things (tosaūta kai toiaūta dianooumenos)...was approached 
by seven young men (neaniskōn) who, acting as if they had some difference with 
each other, cut his throat and killed him. (6.4.31) 
 
With three intensifiers—so young, so many and so grand of thing—Xenophon contrasts 
Jason’s superlative qualities as an aspiring imperialist, on the one hand, and the shocking 
pettiness of his death, on the other. Is there not a disproportion, we wonder, between the 
abilities of this “greatest man of his time” and the circumstances of his death? True, by 
prefacing his account of Jason’s death with a mention of Apollo’s providence, Xenophon 
at least holds out the possibility that Jason’s murderers were acting out the god’s intentions; 
this is the first possibility we sketched out above. However, by characterizing the three 
responsible for his death as impetuous young men,87 Xenophon would seem to emphasize 
the fortuitous character of Jason’s downfall. Jason, the forward-looking imperial visionary, 
is cut down as a result of a spirited outburst on the part of ambitious youths. This 
understanding of his death fits with the second alternative we mentioned above, namely 
that Jason’s fanatical murderers were inspired in part by the unsubstantiated report that 
Jason, an aspiring tyrant over all of Greece, intended to seize “the sacred monies” by force. 
By this account, then, Jason’s death was the result not of Apollo providentially taking care 
of things himself, but rather, of hot-headed young Greeks fearful of Jason’s growing 
tyrannical and imperial power. To this end, Xenophon adds at the end of his account that 
                                                 
86 This unusual word, Homeric in usage (Liddell and Scott, 805), Xenophon uses only once more in the 
Hellenica, in explaining the elderly Agesilaus’ reasons for refusing to lead the Spartan army: “others of such 
an age (tēlikoūtos) were not required to serve” (5.4.13). 
87 Regarding Xenophon’s use of neoniskos, see Buzzetti, Socratic Prince, 94 n 33. 
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“by this [event], it became clear that the Greeks feared powerfully lest [Jason] become 
tyrant” (6.4.32). 
As in his account of Alcibiades’ downfall, Xenophon in describing Jason’s death 
leaves us wondering whether—and if so, how—we could ascertain which of these two 
alternative accounts is the true one. The claims which Xenophon reports suggest that Jason 
came to ruin through divine justice; Jason transgressed divine law by attempting to seize 
Apollo’s treasure, and was fittingly punished. If this were true in Xenophon’s view, then 
the lesson of his account of Jason would seem to be that tyrants and empire-seekers 
invariably incur the wrath of the gods. If, however, Xenophon doubts the claims which he 
reports, then the cause of Jason’s premature downfall would, in Xenophon’s view, be 
natural or human, rather than divine, in origin.  
Nevertheless, as in the case of Alcibiades’ ruin, as well as Thrasybulus’, there is no 
obvious mistake we can point to in Jason’s actions which led to his death. Indeed, 
considering the number of daring, dangerous feats that Jason had successfully 
undertaken—in the course of any of which he might have been killed—before his death, it 
is by no means obvious why his conduct preceding the Pythian Games, and not, say, his 
intervention in Thebes’ invasion of Sparta (6.4.21-22), resulted in his downfall. 
Accordingly, the difficulty of pinpointing the cause of Jason’s downfall as Xenophon 
describes it causes us, in turn, to question with what certainty we can maintain that the 
cause of Jason’s downfall was of natural, and not divine, origin. And if we are unable to 
maintain this position with certainty, then, Xenophon provokes us to wonder, precisely 
what grounds do we have for denying the veracity of those claims (which Xenophon takes 
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care to report) regarding the role played by the gods in Greek affairs? 
It is in light of this question that Jason’s peculiar wisdom comes to sight—namely, 
his wisdom concerning the role he believes “the god” plays, in making the small great, and 
the great, small. Unlike Jason, neither Alcibiades nor Thrasybulus explicitly draw attention 
to the fragility of human affairs generally, and, a fortiori, to the fragility of their own 
imperial ambitions. Jason’s speech thus accords with his deeds—or rather, with his fate—
in a way that the speeches of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus do not. This is intriguing, since, 
as we have seen, it is also Jason who seems to have grasped most firmly an important part 
of Xenophon’s own teaching on empire in the Anabasis, namely that the contentious, 
ambitious Greeks should turn their sights away from Greek in-fighting toward Persia, 
which is exposed in the Anabasis as ripe for the taking. 
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V. Conclusion 
Jason achieves a partial insight into the understanding of empire which Xenophon 
himself evinces through his depiction of failed imperialists in the Hellenica. The outlines 
of this understanding, which I have attempted to bring to light in this study, we might 
summarize as follows. By spotlighting political failure—indeed, the failure of precisely 
those empire-seekers whom we most expect to succeed—Xenophon compels readers of the 
Hellenica to meditate on the role of chance in politics, and in human affairs, generally. One 
of the rhetorical goals that Xenophon seeks to achieve through his treatment of empire in 
the Hellenica would therefore seem to be to shake his readers’ confidence in the capacity 
of humankind to take matters into their own hands, so to speak, and thereby radically to 
ameliorate their fundamental situation by means of politics, without the help of God or 
gods. In this respect, the Hellenica differs from the account of politics and human power 
advanced by modern political philosophers following Machiavelli, as well as from the 
account advanced by Xenophon himself in the Education of Cyrus. By tempering—not to 
say, discouraging—our hopes as regards our ability to achieve political goods by human 
means alone, Xenophon induces us to think through the principles underlying 
Machiavelli’s teaching on chance.88 By the same token, Xenophon casts some doubt on his 
own presentation of the “science of empire” in his Education of Cyrus. In that text, Cyrus 
the Great claims that the gods fight on his side as allies, and then achieves precisely the 
imperial goal he originally sets out to achieve. Thrasybulus in the Hellenica, by contrast—
                                                 
88 See e.g., Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter Fifteen. 
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who Xenophon shows making the very same claim regarding the gods—comes to ruin 
shortly after embarking on his own imperial venture. Did the gods who fought alongside 
the empire-seeker, Cyrus, abandon the empire-seeker Thrasybulus? Or does Thrasybulus’ 
premature downfall in the Hellenica cast doubt on the compatibility of imperialism and 
piety, which the Education seems to affirm? 
Empire brings apparent order and intelligibility to politics, while severely limiting 
freedom. Accordingly, “confusion and disorder” in political things would seem to be the 
price that Greece must pay for the absence of empire. The first of these points Xenophon 
makes clearest in the Education of Cyrus. Yet, as we shall see, it also becomes clear in 
Xenophon’s treatments of empire in the Hellenica. Here, the moments of greatest 
intelligibility are those in which Xenophon draws our attention to a single, determined, 
ambitious man, whose pursuit of empire we can follow. That the Education is substantially 
fictitious is therefore in this respect crucial. The Education, an historical novel, emphasizes 
the strength of Cyrus’ “science of empire”; as Xenophon at least suggests in the first 
chapter of the work, Cyrus’ astonishing success in empire is a direct result of, it flows 
directly from, his science or knowledge of rule. Consequently, we feel confident (to put it 
rather crudely) that we can show that Cyrus had to succeed. By contrast, the Hellenica 
concentrates on the degree to which success and failure in empire depend on factors we 
cannot know; Xenophon “intimates that things do not always turn out as people expect 
them to.”89  
 
                                                 
89 Higgins, Xenophon, 103. 
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